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U.S. Honproliferation Policy, 103-1... 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTBE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 



NOVEMBER 10, 1993 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 







May 






^ 193^ 






U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
76-043 CC WASHINGTON : 1994 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-043685-0 



(\^ U.S. NONPROUFERATION POUCY 



V4,F 76/1 :N 73/4 

U.S. Honproliferation Policy/ 103-1... 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEB ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 



NOVEMBER 10, 1993 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 



"-"^i^iCi 




May 









^m^ 



''«'?*?>, 



/'t'^^. 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
7&-043CC WASHINGTON : 1994 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office. Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-043685-0 



COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 



LEE H. HAMILTON, 

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut 

TOM LANTOS, California 

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey 

HOWARD L. HERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California 
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania 
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 
CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio 
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida 
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland 
DON EDWARDS, California 
FRANK MCCLOSKEY, Indiana 
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio 
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 



Indiana, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. OILMAN, New York 
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania 
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin 
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 
HENRY J. HYDE, Ilhnois 
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 
DAN BURTON, Indiana 
JAN MEYERS, Kansas 
ELTON GALLEGLY, California 
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 
DANA ROHRABACHER, California 
DAVID A. LEVY, New York 
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 
EDWARD R. ROYCE. California 



Michael H. Van Dusen, Chief of Staff 
Richard J. Gabon, Minority Chief of Staff 



(II) 



CONTENTS 



FOREIGN AID REFORM 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Hon. Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary for International Security Affairs, De- 
partment of State 1 

Bill Clements, Acting Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, Depart- 
ment of Commerce 36 

PREPARED STATEMENTS 

Hon. Lynn E. Davis 49 

Norman Wulf, Acting Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency 68 

APPENDIX 
Questions submitted for the record and responses thereto 78 

(III) 



U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 



WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1993 

House of Representatives, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in room 
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton 
(chairmEin) presiding. 

Chairman Hamilton. The committee will please come to order. 
Today's hearing focuses on U.S. nonproliferation policy. 

We are pleased to have as our witness the Honorable Lynn 
Davis, Under Secretary for International Security Affairs at the 
Department of State. Secretary Davis is accompanied by Paul 
Gebhard, Director for Policy Planning and Regional Strategies at 
the Department of Defense; Bill Clements, Acting Assistant Sec- 
retary for Export Administration at the Department of Commerce; 
Victor Alessi, Director of the Office of Arms Control and Non- 
proliferation at the Department of Energy; and Norman Wulf, Act- 
ing Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agen- 
cy. 

In his September 27 speech at the U.N., President Clinton high- 
lighted U.S. nonproliferation policy as one of the most urgent prior- 
ities of his administration. 

We are anxious to receive a more thorough description of the 
goals of the new nonproliferation policy and to hear from each 
agency concerning their plans to implement and achieve these 
goals. 

Secretary Davis and gentlemen, we welcome you. I am advised 
that Secretary Davis has an opening statement. 

Ms. Davis. I have a brief opening and a longer statement which 
I would like to put into the record, but I would hope that we would 
have time to share conversation about our goals and our objectives. 

Chairman Hamilton. That is fine. 

Your statement, of course, will be entered into the record in full 
and we look forward to your testimony and the testimony of your 
colleagues. 

You may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LYNN E DAVIS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
very much for the opportunity to appear before your committee to 
discuss an issue of great importance to the Clinton administration. 
As you and your committee appreciate, nonproliferation is the arms 

(1) 



control priority of the post-cold war world. The proliferation of dan- 
gerous weapons represents the most critical security threat we 
face. As a result, the Clinton administration is placing a very high 
priority on nonproliferation. 

Let me briefly describe the Clinton administration's nonprolifera- 
tion agenda which spans the whole range of proliferation dangers 
and which we are pursuing with a global diplomatic effort. 

SITUATION IN THE NTS 

Secretary Christopher recently returned from a visit, a trip to 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. In addition to pledging 
U.S. support for democratic reform. Secretary Christopher focused 
on the nuclear danger and our goal to prevent the threats posed 
from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

The United States and Russia now as partners are consulting 
very closely on the goals of negotiating as quickly as possible a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, achieving the indefinite extension 
of the Nonproliferation Treaty, a global ban cutting off the produc- 
tion of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes, and the elimi- 
nation of chemical weapons. In Moscow, we worked together to en- 
sure a smooth entry into force of the bilateral Missile Technology 
Control Regime agreement. 

Kazakhstan committed to accede to the NPT as a nonnuclear 
weapons state by the end of this year. In Ukraine, President 
Kravchuk reaffirmed the goal of a nonnuclear Ukraine and his per- 
sonal commitment to ratify the START Treaty and to accede to the 
NPT as a nonnuclear weapons state. He made clear that the Lisbon 
Protocol covers all nuclear weapons in the Ukraine, including the 
SS-24 missiles. 

But much remains to be done, Mr, Chairman, particularly on the 
3,000 former Soviet nuclear warheads that need to be eliminated 
from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The United States is 
working actively to facilitate agreements to transfer all these nu- 
clear warheads to Russia for dismantling and to provide compensa- 
tion for the highly enriched uranium in tnem. 

Through the Nunn-Lugar program, we will assist in the elimi- 
nation of strategic offensive arms in all four states. Such assistance 
is already flowing to Russia and Belarus and we aim to put the 
necessary agreements in place with Ukraine and Kazakhstan in 
the coming weeks. To prevent these Nations from becoming a 
source of dangerous arms and technologies, we are working with 
them to establish effective export control systems. 

Our activities in the Newly Independent States demonstrate the 
many diverse elements which constitute the Clinton administra- 
tion's overall nonproliferation policy. Let me describe our overall 
goals with respect to our nonproliferation policy. 

PROGRESS TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN 

The spread of nuclear weapons is clearly the greatest prolifera- 
tion danger we face. Our foremostgoal is universal NPT member- 
ship. We are actively urging all NPT parties to join us in extending 
the Nonproliferation Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally in 
1995. And I can report to you, Mr. Chairman, that support is grow- 
ing for these goals. 



The Clinton administration has announced two critical initiatives 
in support of our overall nuclear nonproliferation strategy: To 
achieve a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by 1996, and to 
put in place a global convention cutting off production of fissile ma- 
terial for nuclear weapons purposes. 

I can report again momentum toward a CTBT is growing. Last 
summer, the Conference on Disarmament reached consensus on be- 
ginning formal negotiations in Geneva in January of 1994. 

Since then, we nave made good progress on drafting a specific 
CD negotiating mandate for the Conference on Disarmament. And 
in addition, in New York at the Greneral Assembly, for the first 
time, Mr. Chairman, we will achieve a consensus resolution sup- 
porting test ban negotiations. So we see movement and momentum 
toward a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 

NORTH KOREA 

But we also need measures to strengthen the global nuclear non- 
proliferation regime with a regional focus. And here let me describe 
to you briefly one particular area of concern and one particular set 
of policies that are very important to our administration. And this 
has to do with North Korea. 

President Clinton made clear that North Korea cannot be al- 
lowed to develop a nuclear bomb. We are thus working very closely 
with the IAEA, with Japan, South Korea, and other interested par- 
ties to bring North Korea into compliance with all of its inter- 
national obligations. This is not an easy process but we remain 
committed to our goal of having North Korea comply with its safe- 
guards obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty and imple- 
ment the North-South Denuclearization Declaration. 

Recent North Korean behavior has been disappointing. The Unit- 
ed States has made clear its readiness to address legitimate North 
Korean concerns. But unless the North Koreans take the necessary 
steps to persuade the world community that it is not pursuing a 
nuclear weapons option, we will have no choice but to end our bi- 
lateral dialogue with North Korea and pursue further steps in the 
United Nations Security Council. 

EXPORT CONTROLS 

Let me turn then briefly to a number of other initiatives and 
raise with you our goal and the progress we have made with re- 
spect to tightening export controls to prevent the spread of the ma- 
terials necessary to produce chemical and biological weapons. 

With respect to missile proliferation, the multilateral Missile 
Technology Control Regime will continue to be the primary tool of 
U.S. missile nonproliferation policy. It works and has enjoyed sev- 
eral recent successes which this committee has learned about 
through our past consultations. 

In South Africa, Argentina, Hungary and in Russia we are 
achieving successes with respect to the flow of missiles and missile 
technology. We now intend to move the regime into the future, be- 
yond a group of responsible suppliers that seeks to ensure that its 
own industries do not inadvertently contribute to missile prolifera- 
tion, to a group that works actively together to deal with the mis- 
sile proliferation problem worldwide. We have also demonstrated 



that we are prepared to pursue our nonproliferation goals vigor- 
ously even when such efforts involve sanctions and may risk fric- 
tions in critical bilateral relationships. 

Again, moving rather quickly, but to point out the breadth and 
range of the Clinton administration's overall nonproliferation poli- 
cies, we are in the process of reorienting export controls in the 
post-cold war world to meet the new dangers and security concerns 
that we see in the world that we now live in. » 

SUCCESSOR TO COCOM 

There is general agreement that the COCOM controls on trade 
with Russia and the other states of the former Warsaw Pact should 
be phased out and a partnership offered to Russia and other Newly 
Independent States in a new regime. The partnership will be based 
on clearly defined criteria concerning adherence to export controls 
and nonproliferation norms. We and our allies are discussing now 
how best to structure a new regime in partnership with Russia and 
the other Newly Independent States to enhance transparency and 
coordination of controls on exports of arms and sensitive dual-use 
and military technologies. Our approach is multilateral, focused on 
new dangers, and particularly focused on the dangers we see in 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. 

BROAD VIEW OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 

Again, all too briefly, Mr. Chairman, I have gone through the 
various elements of our overall nonproliferation policy. Let me con- 
clude by a few observations with respect to how to think about our 
nonproliferation goals in the new world. 

We very much appreciate the complex nature of the task of pro- 
moting nonproliferation. It is not simply stopping the flow of tech- 
nologies, weapons, or hardware. Ratner, it deals with the tough 
and interrelated issues of security, economics, jobs, and trade. It 
also cuts to the fundamental prerogative of states and that is their 
sovereignty. 

Nonproliferation requires global engagement. Success will also 
require regional strategies tailored to tne specific security concerns 
of individual countries. Diplomacy, backed up by American power, 
represents our primary tool in attaining our nonproliferation goals. 
At the same time, we will ensure that U.S. and allied forces are 
prepared to cope with possible threats if our nonproliferation ef- 
forts were to fail. 

Success will require American leadership. The Clinton adminis- 
tration is poised to undertake that leadership around the world. 
We also recognize that we cannot shoulder all nonproliferation re- 
sponsibilities alone. We will require the help of others to succeed, 
first in controlling trade in dangerous arms and technologies which 
are available now around the world. 

But let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, that as important, if not 
more important, will be that the administration and the Congress 
will work as a team. We share the same nonproliferation goals, and 
working together, in my view, we will be able to achieve these so 
the world knows that the United States stands firmly for these 
goals and that we are prepared to take the steps necessary to 
achieve those goals. 



Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Davis appears at the conclusion 
of the hearing.] 

Chairman Hamilton. Are there any other statements from our 
witnesses? 

OK Thank you, Secretary Davis. 

We will begin with questions, then. 

MOST URGENT PROLIFERATION PROBLEM 

What is the single most urgent proliferation problem today? 

Ms. Davis. I think the single most urgent proliferation problem 
has to do with the potential tnreat of nuclear weapons. That is our 
highest priority. That is not to say that the other priorities are not 
also very important, but to your question, our highest priority is to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

Chairman Hamilton. What country concerns you the most? 

Ms. Davis. Well, there are a number of countries and in many 
ways, these countries raise different kinds of concerns. We focus 
most specifically on the concerns generated by the fact that there 
are very large numbers of nuclear weapons in the former States of 
the Soviet Union. And as I tried to describe in my testimony, the 
various steps that we have been taking to remove those threats, 
and in particular, to ensure that the three states that became inde- 
pendent but on whose territories nuclear weapons existed, are pre- 
pared to make good on their commitments on the Lisbon Protocol, 
that is ratify the START treaty, and become nonnuclear adherents 
to the NPT. 

Chairman Hamilton. When you think about the threat to the 
United States, what country worries you the most? 

Ms. Davis, I still think we need to focus on the nuclear weapons, 
the very large numbers of nuclear weapons in the States of the 
former Soviet Union, even as we build those partnerships with 
those countries. I can move on, though, and focus on a country that 
also raises serious concerns and, clearly, as I presented in my testi- 
mony, the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons in 
North Korea is also a serious concern. 

Chairman Hamilton. As to the threat to the United States, you 
would put the New Independent States ahead of North Korea at 
this moment? 

Ms. Davis. At this moment, Mr. Chairman, I would because 
while we have serious concerns about the possibility that North 
Korea is developing nuclear weapons, they haven't acquired those 
nuclear weapons and, therefore, in that circumstance, they are not 
through those nuclear weapons a direct threat to the United 
States. 

But that is not to say that over time that we wouldn't worry if 
they were to acquire those nuclear weapons and indeed the whole 
purpose of our policy is to prevent that from happening. 

SITUATION in NORTH KOREA 

Chairman Hamilton. Let me ask you, where do things stand 
right now in the negotiations on North Korea's nuclear program? 
What is the United States, South Korea, and the IAEA, asking of 
North Korea? 



6 

Ms. Davis. The United States and the whole international com- 
munity is asking North Korea to carry out its obligations under the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and in addition, to move to imple- 
ment its agreement with South Korea for a denuclearization of that 
peninsula. So what we are seeking to do is to have North Korea 
provide us with confidence that they are not developing nuclear 
weapons. 

Chairman Hamilton. And what has the North Korean response 
been? 

Ms. Davis. As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, in the spring, the 
North Koreans withdrew from the treaty and subsequently have 
suspended their withdrawal from that treaty. They have also per- 
mitted some limited inspections to have occurred over the course 
of the past few months. But their response to us is that they doubt 
the impartiality of the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
have been resisting the kinds of inspections that the agency seeks 
to carry out in order to have confidence that North Korea is carry- 
ing out its obligations under the treaty. 

Chairman Hamilton. So North Korea, at the present time, is un- 
willing to permit the kind of international inspections that we in 
the international community think appropriate. 

Ms. Davis. At the present time, Mr. Chairman, the North Kore- 
ans have not been prepared to accept the kinds of inspections that 
the IAEA is seeking so that the IAEA can have confidence that the 
continuity of safeguards — that is a term of art — ^but that the safe- 
guards regime necessary to have confidence with respect to North 
Korea's activities is being carried out. 

Chairman Hamilton. What does continuity of safeguards mean? 

Ms. Davis. Well, the continuity of safeguards is a way of describ- 
ing the kinds of activities that the IAEA performs in terms of their 
inspections, watching over the kinds of activities that could lead to 
the development of nuclear materials. 

Chairman Hamilton. Has that continuity been broken? 

Ms. Davis. The IAEA has stated that the continuity of safe- 
guards has not at this time been broken but that their confidence 
in their ability to say that North Korea is carrying out their obliga- 
tions is seriously eroding. 

Chairman Hamilton. If they can't get the kind of inspections 
they want, why wouldn't they say the continuity is broken? 

Ms. Davis. Well, it is a process — it is a process that has — it is 
hard to have a single point in time. What happens in the course 
of these inspections, Mr. Chairman, is that the IAEA watches over 
activities associated with the potential production of nuclear mate- 
rials. They had some limited inspections over the past few months 
and were able to say to the world that the continuity of safeguards 
had been maintained but the fact that they are now not permitted 
to do the kind of inspections that they are asking for has led them 
to believe that we are facing a time in which they would not be in 
a position to make that determination. 

Chairman Hamilton. They are not now producing fissile mate- 
rial, are they? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 



Chairman Hamilton. What is the significance of that? Does that 
mean that we do not necessarily need to go to the brink right away 
with North Korea? 

Ms. Davis. Let's step back and say that our overall goal is to pre- 
vent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, and not to ac- 
quire nuclear weapons by developing materials in order to make 
those weapons. The whole purpose of our seeking to follow those 
activities is to give us confidence that they are not currently devel- 
oping nuclear materials. If we are not able to watch over tnose ac- 
tivities, then we would lose confidence over time that they are not 
developing nuclear weapons. 

Chairman Hamilton. Do they have a nuclear weapon today? 

Ms. Davis. The Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Woolsey, has 
testified to this committee and to other committees, that there is 
a possibility, that in the past North Korea could have produced 
weapons-grade material sufficient to produce one to two weapons. 

Chairman Hamilton. They could have? 

Ms. Davis. They could have. 

Chairman Hamilton. Did they? 

Ms. Davis. I think it is his judgment they could have but we 
don't have an independent means to know, but let me go on, Mr. 
Chairman 

Chairman Hamilton. So they could have a nuclear weapon or 
two, but we don't know for sure? 

NORTH KOREAN COMPLL^NCE WITH IAEA STANDARDS 

Ms. Davis. It is that possibility that has led the IAEA to wish 
to do what are called "special inspections," that is to take the steps 
necessary to find out whether in the past North Korea has been 
able to take the steps necessary to acquire or to develop that kind 
of material. 

Chairman Hamilton. And the North Koreans are denying those 
special inspections; is that correct? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Hamilton. Is it correct to say that the North Koreans 
have actually succeeded in racheting down their obligations to the 
international community? 

Ms. Davis. Mr. Chairman, I don't understand the question. 

Chairman Hamilton. Well, have they racheted down from the 
question, for example, of inspection of undeclared facilities to 
whether the IAEA will be allowed to change films and batteries? 

Ms. Davis. It is not that they would have racheted down. Let's 
start with what the IAEA has requested and 

Chairman Hamilton. They are not permitting inspections of 
undeclared facilities, are they? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct. 

Chairman Hamilton. And the newspapers report that the whole 
fight seems to be over whether the IAEA inspectors can put film 
in the camera. 

Ms. Davis. I don't think it is quite 

Chairman Hamilton. That seems to me to be quite a jump down. 

Ms. Davis. No. The IAEA has a set of activities that they would 
wish to carry out in North Korea in order to have confidence that 
the continuity of safeguards is being maintained. 



8 

Chairman Hamilton. And we back the IAEA? 

Ms. Davis. And we clearly back the IAEA in the kinds of activi- 
ties which they wish to be able to carry out. And at this point in 
time, the North Koreans are not permitting the IAEA to carry out 
the activities that they would wish to do. 

That is not to say, Mr. Chairman, that we are not pressing the 
North Koreans to carry those out. Clearly, a very important part 
of the Clinton administration's policy is to gain the North Korean 
support for these essential activities on the part of the IAEA. 

NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS 

Chairman Hamilton. Is it your impression that North Korea is 
hell bent on developing a nuclear weapon or are they seeking to get 
something from us and from the international community? What is 
their game? 

Ms. Davis. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the regime in North 
Korea is isolated and it is very hard from the outside to understand 
precisely what they are seeking or how they are seeking to play 
this particular issue. 

It is for us to define quite clearly what it is that we wish to see 
in terms of their behavior but not to speculate as to what they are 
trying to accomplish but rather to seek that they carry out the 
kinds of obligations which are consistent with their being parties 
to the Nonproliferation Treaty. 

Chairman Hamilton. Do you think they are hell bent on devel- 
oping a nuclear weapon? 

Ms. Davis. I don't have a view as to whether they are hell bent. 
I have a view that it is very important that they, on the part of 
the international community, be brought to carry out the respon- 
sibilities imder the agreement 

Chairman Hamilton. Do you think they are trying to develop a 
nuclear weapon? 

Ms. Davis. At the present time, I have confidence that the — with 
the safeguards that are currently in place and the inspections we 
have been able to take, that they are now not currently developing 
nuclear materials. 

Chairman Hamilton. For a weapon? 

Ms. Davis. For weapons. 

STATUS OF U.S. -NORTH KOREAN CONSULTATIONS 

Chairman Hamilton. Now, are we considering offering them 
some kind of face-saving incentives to allow inspections? There has 
been talk, for example, that we should support the South Korean 
offer to end joint military exercises. Is that on the table in our ne- 
gotiations? Are we saying to the North Koreans, if you will allow 
the IAEA to go in and inspect, we will stop these joint maneuvers 
and allow you to come into South Korea and inspect for nuclear 
weapons. Is there some kind of a deal like that cooking here? 

Ms. Davis. We have said quite clearly to the North in the con- 
versations that we have had over the past two sets of consultations, 
that we wish to address, in the context of resolving the nuclear 
issue according to the goals that we seek — I have described those 
earlier to you — that in the context of resolving the nuclear issue 



that we are prepared to meet the legitimate security concerns of 
North Korea. 

We are not cooking a deal and we are not in the process of back- 
ing down on those goals and seeking to carry — to make clear that 
North 

Chairman Hamilton, So we are not extending any carrots to 
them at this point? Our position is they have to permit the inspec- 
tions, period? 

Ms. Davis. They need to permit the inspections and the second — 
and secondly, to proceed with consultations with the South to carry 
out and implement the denuclearization agreements between the 
North and tne South. 

PROSPECTS FOR U.N. SANCTIONS 

Chairman Hamilton. At what point would we go to the U.N. for 
sanctions? 

Ms. Davis. It is not just that the United States but that the 
whole world community nas said quite clearly to North Korea that 
if they are not prepared to carry out their obligations under the 
NPT 

Chairman Hamilton. Which they are not doing now. 

Ms. Davis. Including their carrying out — including permitting 
the IAEA to carry out the kinds of activities consistent with the 
safeguards regime. 

Chairman Hamilton. Which they are also not doing. 

Ms. Davis. We would then be prepared to move back to the Secu- 
rity Council. 

Chairman Hamilton. Are we ready to go, then? 

Ms. Davis. Well, at this point, we have said quite clearly that 
our patience is running out and that the North Koreans need to 
know that is the next step. 

Chairman Hamilton. How imminent is the next step? 

Ms. Davis. Mr. Chairman, I can't give you a time specific, but 
I can say that our patience is running out. 

CHINESE AND JAPANESE POSITION ON U.N. SANCTIONS 

Chairman Hamilton. And would China support the sanctions? 

Ms. Davis. We have worked very closely with China. The Chi- 
nese Government shares the goals of the United States, South 
Korea, Japan, and the international community with respect to 
North Korea not developing nuclear weapons and remaining within 
the Nonproliferation Treaty. And so we are in daily contact with 
the Chinese seeking those goals. 

Chairman Hamilton. Do you think they would abstain? 

Ms, Davis. It is hard for me to predict what another government 
would do but they share our goals and I would hope that they 
would continue to work with us toward those goals if we have to 
move this back to the Security Council. 

Chairman Hamilton. Does Japan favor the sanctions? 

Ms. Davis. At this point, the Japanese Grovernment also shares 
with us our goals with respect to a nonnuclear North and South 
Korea and have been working closely with us to make that occur. 
I have no doubt that Japan will support those goals if and when 
it would be necessary to move back to the Security Council. 



10 

Chairman Hamilton. So you think they would support sanc- 
tions? 

Ms. Davis. They support these goals, and if it is necessary, the 
kinds of steps necessary to carry out those goals. The Security 
Council made that clear in the spring. The international commu- 
nity has made that clear over the past few weeks. 

Chairman Hamilton. So if you get a refusal from North Korea 
to allow these inspections, it is your judgment that Japan would 
support the sanctions, that South Korea would support the sanc- 
tions, and that China would support the sanctions? 

Ms. Davis. Well, in the course of working to achieve our goal, 
which is through diplomacy so that we don't find ourselves back in 
the Security Council and that North Korea has carried out its obli- 
gations, those three countries have worked with us to give diplo- 
macy a chance. We have given diplomacy a chance and if that par- 
ticular set of goals are not achieved through diplomacy, I believe 
that they would support us as we moved back to the Security 
Council. 

Chairman Hamilton. And seek sanctions? 

Ms. Davis. And seek sanctions. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Manzullo. 

PACE OF denuclearization IN NIS 

Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Davis, Gen- 
eral McGregor Bums testified before this committee several 
months ago and stated that in his opinion, there had been rel- 
atively little done with regard to the dismantling of nuclear war- 
heads in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. Could you give us an 
update on that progress, if any? 

Ms. Davis. Well, we are beginning to make progress in terms of 
the actual dismantlement. The steps required seem to all of us a 
little bit laborious in that we needed to sign agreements, umbrella 
agreements to this — ^for the dismantling of these weapons so that 
fiinds could begin to flow toward those activities. Deactivation is 
occurring in each of three states that acquired nuclear weapons 
with the break up of the former Soviet Union and our funds are 
flowing with respect to Belarus and Russia and that is because 
agreements have been signed and we can get underway. 

I expect and hope in the next few weeks that we will have the 
necessary implementing agreements to begin those steps with re- 
spect to both Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 

Mr. Manzullo. We have had numerous meetings with leaders, 
with Members of the Parliament from Belarus and the Ukraine 
and there seems to be an international chess game over the exact 
costs necessary to dismantle these weapons. 

Could you tell us. Secretary Davis, does the money go directly 
into the hands of the nationals or is the money provided in a fund 
and then AmericEins are used to do the dismantling themselves? 

Ms. Davis. These are funds that go to contracts that are pri- 
marily contracts with Americans who in turn then service the dis- 
mantling of these weapons. 



11 



JAPAN AS A NUCLEAR POWER 



Mr. Manzullo. I appreciate that. The other question, I read in 
the Washington Post on October 31 that Japan may be very much 
interested in developing an atomic presence and that with the loss 
in their Parliament of several Members of the Socialist Party which 
have traditionally been against the use of nuclear weapons, what 
measures do we have in place that would prevent Japan from be- 
coming a nuclear state? 

Ms. Davis. Well, the most important step taken by the Japanese 
Grovemment over the past couple of months is to join the other Gr- 
7 members and many others in the world seeking the indefinite ex- 
tension of the Nonproliferation Treaty. There has been a debate in 
Japan and that debate has led the government to the position 
which is that they continue not only to be themselves members of 
the Nonproliferation Treaty but to support its indefinite extension. 
So whatever articles and quotations you are hearing, I think one 
should focus on what the government is saying and their commit- 
ment to be — to continue to be a nonnuclear power. 

Mr. Manzullo. Is there any question in your mind that Japan 
is not actively engaged in trying to become a nuclear power? 

Ms, Davis. Nothing in terms of their activities suggest to me that 
they are seeking to become a nuclear power. 

status of nis denuclearization program 

Mr. Manzullo. Back to the first question, my understanding is 
that there have been some ballistic missiles that have been trucked 
from Belarus to Russia for the purpose of dismantling. But Belarus 
still has some tactical missiles; is that correct? 

Ms. Davis. The Russians have confirmed to me that all tactical 
nuclear weapons have been removed from the states — the Newly 
Independent States, so I 4;hink there is not any indication that that 
report is correct. 

Mr. Manzullo. That is from Belarus 

Ms. Davis. All three. 

Mr. Manzullo. All three? 

Ms. Davis. Yes. Kazakhstan and Belarus and Ukraine. 

Mr. Manzullo. So what would be left in those states is ballistic 
missiles? 

Ms. Davis. Strategic missiles. 

Mr. Manzullo. But none have been dismantled to date; is that 
correct? 

Ms. Davis. We are in the course of following closely the deactiva- 
tion and dismantling of these warheads. And in the case of 
Belarus, at this point, there are 72 what are known as SS-25 stra- 
tegic missiles, currently in Belarus, and under the agreements that 
they have made to become a nonnuclear state, these will be re- 
moved back to Russia. 

PROGRESS toward THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF UKRAINE 

Mr. Manzullo. Then what about the nagging problem of the 
Ukraine wanted to maintain a nuclear presence in light of their 
history with Russia? 



12 

Ms. Davis. Well, as I indicated in mv opening statement, one of 
the critical goals that the Secretary had when he just visited in the 
Ukraine was to convince the government of our determination to 
see them carry out their commitments made in Lisbon to ratify the 
START I Treaty and to become a nonnuclear member of the Non- 
proliferation Treaty. There is clearly a debate going on in the 
Ukraine, but the President of Ukraine made his personal commit- 
ment that that government intended to carry it out, and to follow 
up from that, we are working very hard to begin the dismantle- 
ment process. 

The |;ood news from that particular trip was that Ukraine and 
the United States signed the umbrella agreement for the disman- 
tling of their nuclear weapons in Ukraine. We hope to have in place 
implementing agreements so that this can get underway in the 
coming few weeks. 

Mr. Manzullo. Mr. Chairman, if I may ask one more question? 

Chairman HAMILTON. Yes. 

SUCCESSOR REGIME TO COCOM 

Mr, Manzullo. Secretary Davis, could you give us a scenario, if 
one has been developed, on the State Department's plans to replace 
COCOM? 

Ms. Davis. I was going to say that is a final question and that 
I could go on indefinitely. 

Mr. Manzullo. In 2 minutes or less. 

Ms. Davis. Let me make a couple of points and I can follow up 
to the extent that you wish. 

The first is that we are working with our allies with the goal of 
replacing the COCOM regime, bom of the East-West confrontation, 
with a successor regime focused on our new strategic concerns in 
which Russia and the other Newly Independent States would be a 
partner in this regime and that we would focus particularly on the 
transfer of and sales of sensitive dual-use items and also arms to 
areas and particular countries of — of particular concern, Iran, Iraq, 
North Korea and Libya. 

So we are seeking a successor regime focused on the new strate- 
gic concerns by a bilateral regime where Russia is a partner, not 
a target. 

Mr. Manzullo. Thank you. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Gejdenson. 

U.S. arms sales to the middle east 

Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Could you tell me what is the value of our arms sales into the 
Middle East since the Iran-Iraq War, and since the Kuwaiti War. 

Ms. Davts. I am sorry. I don't hold those numbers in my head. 
There have been some important sales, and if I could provide the 
specific numbers for the record, but following on the Gulf War, it 
was important to provide security to those states in that region 
whose security had been threatened by events in Iraq. 

[The information follows:] 

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, our data shows that countries in the 
Middle East and Persian Gulf have accepted about $50,254 billion in govemment- 
to-govemment sales. This includes $23,908 billion sold since Desert Storm. 



13 

With regard to commercial military exports to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, 
the U.S. has issued licenses (authorizations) valued at $26,799 billion since the end 
of the Iran-Iraq war, of which $12.49 billion were issued since Desert Storm. How- 
ever, I would note that, historically, only about 40 percent of commercial licenses 
issued result in actual exports. 

Therefore, the total of U.S. Middle East defense sales since the Irem-Iraq war, is 
$50,254 billion in FMS plus an estimated $10.72 billion commercial, for a total of 
about $61 billion. The majority of these sales were for defensive systems (e.g. Pa- 
triot and I-Hawk air defense systems) and logistical support services for established 
programs. 

Mr. Gejdenson, Would you say it is a safe bet that we are the 
foremost arms merchant into the Middle East by a significant fac- 
tor? 

Ms. Davis. We have sales of considerable value into the Middle 
East. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Some of us benefit from those when we make 
our own particular parts of them. 

Ms. Davis. These are U.S. sales and U.S. jobs. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Everybody else is a distant second when you 
look at arms sales into the region? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct. 

IMPACT OF U.S. sales ON ARMS TRANSFERS WORLDWIDE 

Mr. Gejdenson. Then when you go to COCOM and you try to 
get restrictions on conventional arms, maybe it is not surprising 
that we have less than an enthusiastic response from some of our 
allies because they have got their places in the world where they 
profit and get jobs from arms sales. 

Do you have a strate^ for finding a way to end this race? All 
of us have our in-distnct pressure trying to get the arms sales 
through because we want our people to work, but then when we 
look at the explosions around the world, I mean, thankfully, we are 
not selling arms into Yugoslavia at the moment or other countries. 
But now we, the major powers, are trying to cooperate. It doesn't 
necessarily seem to have slowed down the arms sales. 

Ms. Davis. I think actually you will begin to see some slowing 
down of the arms sales, but that is not your major point. The major 
point is how it is that we seek to gain constraints on the sales of 
arms to areas that pose security threats to ourselves and to our al- 
lies, and what kinds of leverage or persuasion do we have when we 
are selling arms ourselves. 

TARGET COUNTRIES OF SUCCESSOR REGIME TO COCOM 

And the way we make the case, and I think and very much hope 
we can sustain the case, is that we wish to direct constraints on 
arms and their sales to areas of the world and particular countries 
that are particularly dangerous, and here we have in mind Iran, 
Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and more generally in areas of concern, 
South Asia and the Middle East. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Syria is not a country of concern? 

Ms, Davis. Syria directly is not a country of concern. We are very 
much worried about stability and security in the Middle East re- 
gion as a whole, so that is the way 

Mr. Gejdenson. But is Syria on the list of countries that we are 
concerned about? 



76-043 0-94-2 



14 

Ms. Davis. Syria is not on the list of target countries in the sense 
of the proposals that we are making in a successor regime to 
COCOM. But clearly, as you understand, they are still very much 
on the list that we have with respect to terrorist 

Mr. Gejdenson. What separates Syria from other countries like 
Libya, Iraq, and Iran? 

Ms. Davis. In our view, because of our worries about Syria and 
its terrorist connections, there is no difference. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Then why isn't it on the list? 

Ms. Davis. Let me step back and say — let me tell you what I am 
trying to do and 

Mr. Gejdenson. I guess what I am trying to get across is that 
maybe Syria ought to be in that list. I don t want to badger you 
on it, and I will be happy to give you time to answer, but I want 
to get on to another question. 

Ms. Davis. Can I make a small point, and that is what the Unit- 
ed States is seeking to gain in the successor regime, support for 
controls on arms. My response is we are doing that by seeking to 
show that we need to focus on the dangers and we need to do it 
together, and we have learned the lessons of Iraq, and that if we 
don't do it together, we suffer in the future. 

reevaluating technology transfer policies 

Mr. Gejdenson. Let me ask another question. 

I have watched the export control issue now for a number of 
years, and in trying to deal with our allies our alliance sometimes 
becomes mistrustful of our agenda. We had a situation where the 
United States refused an export license to sell a bank card to Eng- 
land. Apparently they were worried about the chip in the bank 
card. On the other hand, we transferred to the British the blue- 
prints for the Trident submarine and gave them the missiles to go 
with it. 

It seemed to be kind of a strange set of circumstances. We block 
in COCOM a 30-year-old computer going to Vietnam from France, 
so the French then would kind of retaliate in some other area when 
it came along. How do we get our own politics, whether it is Cuban 
Americans, or other parts of the globe pressing the United States 
to take actions that aren't really serious threats and don't create 
problems in the technology sense. 

I guess what I am saying is shouldn't we focus on chokepoints 
of technology, on the technologies that really have something to do 
with proliferation, and not eimer squander the American economy 
or harass our allies on things that are irrelevant? 

The example I used in the previous administration, was that 
there was this great battle going on between the Secretary of Com- 
merce Mosbacher and Secretary of Defense Cheney over decontrol- 
ling 286 computers. It was a joke. It had nothing to do with pro- 
liferation. And what I am hopeful is that in this new administra- 
tion we will be able to get a reasonable focus, pick our terrorist 
countries, and I put Syria in that ^oup, making sure that we don't 
allow technology transfer to occur m those cases. 

And if you want to go beyond reason, which may make some 
sense for foreign policy reasons even if they don't have proliferation 
arguments, but not to create the kind of morass that we have lived 



15 

with for a decade here of technology that is generally available and 
isn't critical just to the nuclear, chemical, or biological program. 

Ms. Davis. Well, I think we are starting down that — in that di- 
rection in the liberalization that the President announced with re- 
spect to computers and trying, as you suggest, to balance out the 
goals of liberalizing while at the same time ensuring that the very 
sensitive technologies are controlled for nonproliferation purposes. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Let me give you an example of where we are 
having trouble today. 

Ms. Davis. I figured you would have one in our administration. 

Mr. Gejdenson. I hate to do this because I really like your ad- 
ministration, I think they are doing a great job, and they have 
moved at lightning speed compared to what we have done over the 
last 12 years. 

Ms. Davis. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Gejdenson. There is no question in my mind that we have 
a critical difference in this area. At the same time the previous ad- 
ministration was signing nuclear licenses to Iraq, they were stop- 
ping things going to Western Democratic countries and it was in- 
sanity. And I want to applaud you for what you have done, but we 
are still doing some things that don't make a lot of sense. 

We had a hearing on my subcommittee some time ago that 
showed that while the administration was denying the export li- 
cense to AT&T for 565 switching stations for telecommunications, 
that the Chinese were making their own and the Israelis were sell- 
ing them 623s. Now, that didn't seem to make a lot of sense and 
I would have thought when the administration, which I had such 
great admiration for, saw this kind of insanity, they would allow 
the Americans to compete. But what was the response of the ad- 
ministration? 

They started beating up this little Israeli company telling them 
not to sell that 623 there, because they may lose all their export 
licenses for the parts they need from the United States. 

Now, the answer ought to be let's let the Americans compete in 
that area. It is not an area that we can control, it doesn't make 
sense to continue those. I am just hopeful we are talking about a 
lag time here and that you are going to get to where I think you 
ought to go. 

SUPPORT FOR UNILATERAL CONTROLS IN SOME CASES 

Let American companies get a piece of that market before we 
lose it completely. And I guess what that comes to is at what point, 
and I believe there are instances where you need to do this, at 
what point do you believe in unilateral controls? 

I mean, we clearly do not control technology like we used to. Lots 
of it is available from different places in the world. There are in- 
stances where I would believe in unilateral controls if we could get 
no one in the rest of the world to join with us. And you know the 
recent history of the best examples, obviously, are Iraq, Iran, and 
countries of that nature. But there are times where you draw a line 
in the sand, and you say this country is so dangerous even if they 
could buy these weapons, this technology, these dual-use items 
from every other country in the globe, the United States isn't going 



16 

to sell it to them. I don't have a problem with that policy. It needs 
to be delineated. 

Ms. Davis. I share with you the need to make sure that we don't 
lose the President's ability to place unilateral controls for these se- 
rious dangers. On the other hand, we are going through those con- 
trols carefully to see that we continue to believe that they are nec- 
essary for the new world. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Mr. Burton. 

SMUGGLING OF WEAPONS FROM THE NIS 

Mr. Burton. Thank, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I appre- 
ciate the loyalty shown by Mr. Gejdenson to the Clinton adminis- 
tration. I really thought tnat was well done. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you. 

Mr. Burton. Secretary Davis, one of the areas that I have a 
great deal of interest in is the smuggling of various kinds of weap- 
ons and weapons parts across the borders from the old Soviet 
Union into Germany and into Austria, and other countries, from 
which it is then sold or taken to other countries. 

I have been told by some intelligence people from outside the 
United States that there is a real problem with nuclear fissionable 
material going into Germany. It has been caught at the border on 
numerous occasions, chemical and biological materials and weap- 
ons have been caught at the borders. How widespread is this and 
how much of it is getting out of the Soviet Union through the black 
market? 

Ms. Davis. We very much share your concern with the possibili- 
ties that such materials, technologies, or items, flight be leaving 
these territories, these Newly Independent States. That is why it 
is a high priority in the various activities that we have with each 
of these states, that we put in place an export control regime so 
that they themselves can monitor and have confidence that these 
activities are not taking place. So we share the need to be sure, to 
be confident. 

You asked me to give you a sense of how bad or how serious the 
problem might be with respect to these items. And, again, we can 
go into more details if you would wish and the intelligence commu- 
nity is the place to be very specific. 

Every time we hear a report of this we look into it. We try to 
find out what is happening. We work with our allies and their offi- 
cials to intercept these. \^ have examples of this. We are as con- 
cerned with this, our allies are concerned with this. So I am saying 
two things: one, we know it is a potential problem and we are 
working to get at the heart of that problem, which is export control 
regimes that are adequate. And secondly, when we hear of this, 
with the intelligence community and the State Department, we use 
whatever we can to find out about this and block it from happen- 
ing. 

terrorist access to nuclear, chemical and biological 

weapons 

Mr. Burton. Secretary Davis, I would appreciate it if you would 
have whatever intelligence information that is available sent to my 
office or else have somebody come by to talk to me, because I would 



17 

really like to check into this. This is a real concern. The American 
people are not aware of it, and I know that some of this is classi- 
fied, so we won't get into it. 

We had the terrorist attack in New York at the World Trade 
Center. Some of this fissionable material and some of these weap- 
ons are very small. And they are very mobile and we need to along 
with our allies have some kind of a system that is as foolproof as 
possible to make sure that chemical, biological, and nuclear weap- 
ons that are portable don't get into this country or other — or our 
allies' countries. And I think the Members of the Congress ought 
to have their antenna raised because there is a real proliferation, 
as far as I have been told, that is taking place in this area through 
the black market, and much of it emanates from the old Soviet 
Union. And if you — you take some of this chemical and biological 
material, and it could be devastating to large cities, as well as the 
nuclear problem. And so I would appreciate very much if I could 
get a briefing on that, number one. And number two, I would urge 
the administration, I am sure you are probably already working on 
this, but I would urge the administration and our DIA, CIA and 
others to do everything they can to work with our allies to make 
sure that we intercept as much of this as possible and keep this 
to a minimum. Because it wouldn't take much to destroy literally 
millions of people. 

Ms. Davis. We certainly agree with the concerns. I don't want to 
raise it out of proportion, that is we take it seriously, but I don't 
think it is a danger in which we ought to create too much publicity. 
We work on it day to day. 

Mr. Burton. I understand. 

Ms. Davis. We certainly will provide you with what intelligence 
we have. One of the reasons that we are spending as much time 
as we are seeking the dismantlement of these weapons, getting the 
materials out of these weapons, blending down these materials so 
that they are not usable for nuclear weapons purposes, putting in 
place in 1995, the Chemical Weapons Convention, getting rid of 
them, all of these things are part of our overall policy. 

Mr. Burton. I don't want to prolong this, and I appreciate the 
chairman's indulgence. Let me just say, and this is not classified, 
we know that in the Sudan, for instance, there probably are several 
terrorist camps outside Khartoum that are training terrorists in a 
number of new methods of terrorism, and if this material is leaking 
out or leaching out of the old Soviet Union and it gets into their 
hands, it does pose a threat to the United States and our allies. 

I mean, if they could do what they did at the World Trade Center 
with normal materials, dynamite and things like that, just think 
what they could do with this other stuff. I think it is a real threat 
and they are doing everything they can to cause problems without 
focus, and our allies, and destabilize some of our allies in the Mid- 
dle East. And they are even sending terrorists into Somalia. So this 
is a real concern, and I just — I can't emphasize enough that I hope 
the administration makes this a top priority and works with our 
allies to make sure this transportation of these various kinds of 
weapons are kept to a minimum. 



18 

Ms. Davis. We agree, and it is a very high priority. And you un- 
derstand the difficulty, but that doesn't mean we don't take the 
challenge. 

Mr. Burton. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Lantos. 

PROLIFERATION CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO IRAN 

Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Davis, what are your key concerns with respect to Iran in 
the field of proliferation/ 

Ms. Davis. My concerns with respect to Iran span the whole 
range of our nonproliferation objectives, that is Iran's behavior, in 
my view, in seeking to acquire dangerous arms, nuclear tech- 
nologies in order to develop nuclear weapons, as well as — I think 
I have lost my mike. 

We also have worries about their intentions with respect to the 
acquisition of dangerous arms and missiles and missile technology, 
so I am very worried about the behavior of Iran. 

Mr. Lantos [presiding]. To what extent do your concerns stem 
from the failure of some of our allies, particularly Germany in this 
case, in cooperating with us to prevent Iran from acquiring all 
these weapons? 

Ms. Davis. I wouldn't single out any country, and I 
especially 

Mr. Lantos. Why do you think that news reports do single out 
Germany? 

Ms. Davis. I am not sure which news reports you are referring 
to. We have close contact 

Mr. Lantos. You are unaware of the fact that there have been 
many reputable news reports focusing on Germany with respect to 
Iranian developments in this field? 

Ms. Davis. Germany continues to have relations with Iran and 
continues to carry out trade with Iran. I would not argue that Ger- 
many is contributing to the kinds of activities and behavior that I 
have just described with respect to Iran. On the other hand, in 
close consultations with Germany, we are seeking to ensure that 
none of these activities are being undertaken. 

Mr. Lantos. Could you expand on that bit, because I don't find 
your answer very responsive to my question. 

Ms. Davis. Well, I am not sure what you are asking me. Con- 
gressman. 

Mr. Lantos. Are we satisfied with allied cooperation in dealing 
with Iran on this issue of nonproliferation? 

Ms. Davis. OK We would wish that our allies would join us, and 
this is the goal that we are seeking with respect to a successor re- 
gime not to 

Mr. Lantos. Beyond wishing, what we have done to bring this 

about? 

Ms. Davis. Let me tell you my goal and let me tell you where 
we are with respect to that. 

Mr. Lantos. I know what your goal is. I am not interested in 
your goal. Your goal is full cooperation. My question is, are our al- 
lies cooperating and if not, what are we telling them? 



19 

Ms. Davis. First of all, I haven't achieved my goal, you are cor- 
rect. And secondly, that hasn't led me to give up in seeking their 
agreement. I believe that we will gain from our allies a regime in 
which we discuss and we work together to control dangerous trade 
in strategic arms and strategic technologies to Iran. So I believe 
that we will accomplish that. I haven't accomplished that goal 
today. 

Mr. Lantos. Do you see a parallel between what happened with 
respect to the arming of Iraq earlier and what is now taking place 
with respect to Iran? 

Ms. Davis. It is precisely because I don't want it to happen again 
in the way it happened with Iraq, that the Clinton administration 
cares so much with respect to the trade in technologies and dual- 
use arms, dual-use technologies and arms to Iran. 

IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 

Mr. Lantos. Is your view that Iraq still has undiscovered nuclear 
capabilities? 

Ms. Davis. Well, in the process of the various inspections that 
have been underway, the international community is seeking to 
carry out those resolutions which will mean that Iraq will no 
longer have nuclear weapons or materials that could contribute to 
nuclear weapons. At this point, the administration does not believe 
that we have succeeded in carrying out — or Iraq has succeeded in 
carrying out all of their obligations under those sanctions, so I 
couldn't answer "yes" at this point to your question. 

Mr. Lantos. We have no assurance that Iraq does not have nu- 
clear capability; is that your testimony? 

Ms. Davis. At this point, we are not prepared to say anything 
different than that. 

Mr. Lantos. If Iraq continues to reject the establishment of long- 
term monitoring programs, what would be the timeframe for Iraq 
to resuscitate its nuclear program to the levels of the pre-Desert 
Storm period? 

Ms. Davis. I am not sure that I can speculate with respect to 
time, but I can tell you that we are committed to ensuring that 
Iraq agrees to this long-term monitoring regime. 

Mr. Lantos. Would the timeframe be shortened if sanctions were 
lifted? 

Ms. Davis. Well, it would depend — it would depend. Congress- 
man Lantos, on precisely what then happened following the lifting 
of sanctions. 

Mr. Lantos. Well, the lifting of sanctions would provide 

Ms. Davis. We have no intention 

Mr. Lantos. The lifting of sanctions would provide them with 
money, allowing a great deal to be done. 

Ms. Davis. We have no plans to lift those sanctions. 

Mr. Lantos. So your answer is that the lifting of sanctions would 
in fact shorten the timeframe. 

Ms. Davis. The point here is that the sanctions are in place be- 
cause we don't have confidence that Iraq is not in a position to de- 
velop weapons of mass destruction, so we will keep those sanctions 
in place until we have that confidence. 



20 

IRAQI CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES 

Mr. IjANTOS. What is your view of Iraqs having rebuilt its con- 
ventional military arsenal? 

Ms. Davis. Are you suggesting to me that they have rebuilt their 
conventional arsenal? 

Mr. Lantos. I am asking what your view is? 

Ms. Davis, Under the sanctions, we have focused on the develop- 
ment of the dangerous weapons of mass destruction, so there has 
been some continued activity with respect to their conventional ar- 
maments. But I would suggest that we have our eyes on the right 
focus and that is their potential development of weapons of mass 
destruction. 

Mr. Lantos. The committee will be in recess while this vote is 
cast. 

[Recess.] 

LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR PRESIDENT'S NONPROLIFERATION 

AGENDA 

Chairman Hamilton [presiding]. The committee will resume its 
sitting. 

In the President's September 27 speech at the U.N., he an- 
nounced a number of nonproliferation goals — a global ban on the 
production of fissile material for weapons purposes and expansion 
of the Missile Technology Control Regime to make it global, a com- 
prehensive ban on nuclear testing, universal adherence and ratifi- 
cation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, strengthening the Bio- 
logical Weapons Convention. 

Are we going to need any legislative changes to achieve any of 
those goals? 

Ms. Davis. Well, at this point, we are negotiating the two con- 
ventions that we laid out here. This is the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty and a global convention preventing the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons purposes. If we are successful in 
these treaties, we will clearly come back to the Senate for their 
ratification. But in the near term, I am not looking for any specific 
legislation in order to carry out these goals. 

AGENCY responsibility FOR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 

IMPLEMENTATION 

Chairman HAMILTON. Now, what agency of the government has 
the responsibility to achieve those goals or is it divided in some 
way? 

Ms. Davis. Well, this is a team effort, Mr. Chairman. We all 
work as a team and when we go to negotiate arms controls agree- 
ments, the comprehensive test ban, the global convention on the 
cutoff of fissile material, we go as an interagency team. And de- 
pending on the forum, depending on the kinds of consultations, 
sometimes the State Department leads these, and I have been lead- 
ing these in the preparations for the comprehensive test ban, but 
when we get underway in Geneva in those negotiations for — in the 
Conference on Disarmament, it will be led by Ambassador Ledogar 
who comes from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 



21 

Chairman Hamilton. Are you the "Nonproliferation Czar" in this 
administration? 

Ms. Davis. I have never been quite given that title, but I will 
take it as one to see whether I can 

Chairman Hamilton. You are the head person. 

Ms. Davis. I am the head person. 

Chairman Hamilton. Now, are you in charge of each of the nego- 
tiations here — ^fissile material, MTCR, nuclear testing, the Non- 
proliferation Treaty, chemical weapons, biological weapons — ^you 
are in charge of all these negotiations? 

Ms. Davis. Well, if you are looking for someone that you can al- 
ways talk to, someone that takes responsibility for actively carrying 
out the goals of the President, come to me. 

Chairman Hamilton. OK. So we have a negotiator, I presume, 
for each one of those areas? 

Ms. Davis. Different negotiators, different fora, different rep- 
resentatives, depending on the group. 

Chairman HAMILTON. They would report to you? 

Ms. Davis. Well, they ultimately report to the President, but you 
know I try to bring a coherence and energy to this set of activities. 

Chairman HAMILTON. They report through you to the President; 
is that it? 

Ms. Davis. Well, I think each of their principals reports to the 
President and we work as a team. 

Chairman Hamilton. Well, that sounds kind of murky. 

Ms. Davis. Mr. Chairman, the way the executive branch puts to- 
gether policies, the best of it is that we bring perspectives and ex- 
pertise and understandings to the formulation of these policies. But 
if I hear your question as one that you would like to be able to al- 
ways look to, I would ask that you look to me. 

Chairman Hamilton. Well, it is hard to find out who has respon- 
sibility in this government. That is why I am asking these ques- 
tions. 

Ms. Davis. I am a little surprised that you say that, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

Chairman Hamilton. You wouldn't be if you sat where I have for 
the last 25 years. 

Ms. Davis. Well, now you have the answer. I will be the person. 

IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 

Chairman Hamilton. OK. 

Now, let's talk a little bit about Iraq. The IAEA officials indicate 
that they believe they have discovered virtually all of Iraq's nuclear 
program and that Iraq has substantially reduced or eliminated its 
nuclear program; is that your judgment? 

Ms. Davis. What we say with respect to nuclear weapons in Iraq 
is that the U.N. inspection efforts have effectively put the Iraqi nu- 
clear weapons program out of business for the near term. But we 
still believe that Iraq retains some nonfissile materials, equipment, 
and most importantly, expertise with which they could then again 
develop these kinds of capabilities. So what we are looking toward 
is putting in place a long-term monitoring regime to prevent Iraq 
from developing large-scale weapons of mass destruction. 



22 

Chairman Hamilton. So it certainly is correct to say that the 
major aspects of their nuclear program have been uncovered; is 
that right? 

Ms. Davis. That is our description of the current state 

Chairman Hamilton. All right. 

Ms. Davis [continuing]. Based on those inspections. 

Chairman Hamilton. There have been some reports of an under- 
ground nuclear reactor. Are you comfortable that the IAEA has 
taken sufficient steps to try to locate that alleged Iraqi under- 
ground nuclear reactor? 

Ms. Davis. Well, I have heard of that allegation, Mr. Chairman, 
and we still believe or still have confidence in the statement that 
I just made. On the other hand, one of the reasons that we don't 
believe that we are finished with our task with respect to Iraq, and 
why it is that we need to have this long-term monitoring regime 
and a period of time in which Iraq complies with its obligations, is 
that we would worry that Iraq might find ways over time to de- 
velop again these dangerous weapons. 

LONG-TERM MONITORING OF IRAQ AND IRAN 

Chairman Hamilton. The long-term monitoring is not in place 
now; is that correct? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct. We have begim discussions, strongly 
supported by the Security Council, to put in place that regime, but 
we are not there yet. 

Chairman HAMILTON. What is the U.N. planning with regard to 
long-term monitoring? What kind of plans do they have? 

Ms. Davis. Well, I think we are in consultations and discussions 
with Iraq to put that regime in place. As I said to you, that we 
have at least begun to carry out such discussions with that as our 
goal, but we have some far distance to travel. 

Chairman Hamilton. Iraq is refusing to put a long-term mon- 
itoring regime into place; is that correct. 

Ms. Davis. So far they have not agreed to what are all the steps 
necessary to put that regime in place. 

Chairman Hamilton. And if they continue to reject the estab- 
lishment of a long-term regime, how long would it take them to put 
into place a nuclear weapons program and bring it up to, say, the 
pre-Desert Storm levels? 

Ms. Davis. I can't tell you precisely, Mr. Chairman, the time- 
frame. What I can tell you is that we would not be confident that 
Iraq did not have nuclear weapons unless we had such a long-term 
monitoring regime, so what we can say about its current programs 
is not sufficient for us to move beyond our current steps with re- 
spect to Iraq or in any way to be in a position to remove sanctions. 

Chairman Hamilton. I assume our principal concern now is 
their expertise and their ingenuity in developing weapons of mass 
destruction. 

Ms. Davis. That is the primary worry. Once you know how to de- 
velop these kinds of weapons, you don't forget that. 



23 

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO IRAQ 

Chairman Hamilton. Their nuclear capabihties, I guess, arise 
principally from exports from other countries into Iraq. Are we tak- 
ing steps to prevent their reacquiring nuclear equipment? 

Ms. Davis. Well, the sanctions regime — witn the international 
community's agreement — states that we will not be trading in arms 
or dual-use technologies or the kinds of items that permitted such 
developments in the past. That continues now with respect to Iraq. 
So that is the means by which we are not repeating the mistakes 
of the past. 

Chairman Hamilton. Are you getting good cooperation from our 
allies with respect to sending equipment to Iraq that could be used 
for nuclear weapons purposes or buildup of military capabilities? 

Ms. Davis. Here we have consensus with respect to preventing 
the buildup of these kinds of capabilities. 

Chairman Hamilton. So you are getting good cooperation? 

Ms. Davis. We are getting good cooperation with respect to Iraq. 

Chairman Hamilton. International compliance with Iraqi sanc- 
tions is good, so far as you are able to see? 

Ms. Davis. We watcn over that very carefully and can provide 
you with more detail than I carry in my own memory, but we think 
it is pretty good. 

[The information follows:] 

The international community is making a good faith effort to enforce the sanctions 
and ensure that, with few exceptions, only food, medicine and humanitarian goods 
are entering Iraq. The Multinational Interdiction Force routinely monitors ships 
destined for the Jordanian port of Aqaba, the primary conduit for imports to Iraq. 
The flow of goods through Turkey is monitored by the international presence in 
northern Iraq. 

The world-wide embargo on Iraqi oU exports is holding firm. Iraqi oil pipelines 
through Turkey and Saudi Arabia remain closed. The loss of oil export earnings has 
substantially lunited Iraq's ability to finance imports. 

Chairman Hamilton. The European allies are stopping ship- 
ments of dual-use equipment? 

Ms. Davis. With respect to Iraq, yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Hamilton. But not Iran? 

Ms. Davis. I think this is a different case. And this is why the 
Clinton administration has made it a high priority, both with re- 
spect to our bilateral relations with our allies and also with our 
new partners, Russia and the Newly Independent States, that we 
refrain from the trade in arms as well as in dangerous dual-use 
technologies. 

IRAQ'S CONVENTIONAL ARMS BUILDUP 

Chairman Hamilton. I will come back to Iran in a few minutes, 
but I want to pursue Iraq a little further. 

Do we have any concerns about Iraq's conventional arms build- 
up? 

Ms. Davis. I was asked that earlier, Mr. Chairman, and, of 
course, we would not wish Iraq to become highly armed with con- 
ventional means as well. We have a policy of denying the trade in 
arms, conventional arms to Iraq, and that is being supported by 
the international community. Their own modernization and devel- 
opment of the arms that they retained at the end of the war, which 



24 

were far less than they began with, is something that they can con- 
tinue, but they are not getting any international support for that 
set of steps. 

REPORTS OF IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE 

Chairman Hamilton. What about the reports we have seen 
about the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against the Shiites in 
the southern marshlands there. 

Ms. Davis. We certainly are very worried about that possibility. 
And I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, to address those questions 
more specifically to those in the intelligence community who follow 
that closely. 

Chairman Hamilton. You don't have any specific information 
about that? 

Ms. Davis. I don't have any specific information about that be- 
yond what it is that has been reported publicly. 

UKRAINIANS DELAY START AND NPT RATIFICATION 

Chairman Hamilton. You mentioned the Secretary's trip to 
Ukraine. Were you with him? 

Ms. Davis. I was with him. 

Chairman Hamilton. Did we discuss with them a specific dead- 
line for ratification of START and the Nonproliferation Treaty? 

Ms. Davis. We come away discouraged that Ukraine has not 
been willing to place a time in carrying out their commitments 
under the Lisbon Protocol, President Kravchuk made a personal 
commitment to the Secretary to place before the Rada in this ses- 
sion, the START I Treaty for ratification, and indicated his agree- 
ment to that ratification as well as their adherence to the Non- 
proliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state. 

Chairman Hamilton. Can he make that policy stick? 

Ms. Davis. That is, Mr. Chairman, as if you asked me whether 
it is always the case that President Clinton can make stick the 
policies of our administration when they come before the Congress. 
Quite frankly, there is a debate going on in the Ukraine. Secretary 
Christopher also met with leaders of the Rada. They spoke about 
their commitment as well to carrying out the commitments 
Ukraine made under the Lisbon Protocol. 

Chairman Hamilton. What did they say to you? 

Ms. Davis. They said that they believed that the Rada would 
make good on those commitments. 

Chairman Hamilton. When? 

Ms. Davis. But they did not themselves place or give us a com- 
mitment to a specific time. That doesn't mean, Mr. Chairman 

Chairman Hamilton. Were they going to make good on the com- 
mitment some time in the near future? What are they waiting for? 

Ms. Davis. Well, they are waiting for, by their own statements, 
confidence in the security of Ukraine. And we have discussed with 
them the kinds of assurances that not only the United States but 
also Russia, other parties to the NPT, other nuclear parties to the 
NPT, are prepared to make to them as part of their becoming ad- 
herents to the Nonproliferation Treaty. In that context. Secretary 
Christopher also 



25 

Chairman Hamilton. Well, if they are waiting for the security 
of the Ukraine, that is a pretty nebulous thing. We could be wait- 
ing a long time, couldn't we? 

Ms. Davis. Well, actually, we argue from a somewhat different 
perspective, Mr. Chairman. That is that their security is made 
more — they are made more secure by carrying out their commit- 
ments in the international community, gaining the assurances 
that 

SECURITY COMMITMENTS TO UKRAINE 

Chairman Hamilton. They are not buving that argument? 

Ms. Davis. They are still discussing their security concerns with 
us. I think the Clinton administration's proposals for a Partnership 
for Peace in the context of transforming NATO, are an additional 
step that the United States and NATO will be making in terms of 
providing security to Ukraine as it takes these important steps to 
become a nonnuclear state. 

Chairman Hamilton. You are not suggesting that we are going 
to provide them the kind of security commitments given to mem- 
bers of NATO, are you? 

Ms. Davis. The security assurances that we are prepared to pro- 
vide to Ukraine are those consistent with our commitments within 
the CSCE. 

Chairman Hamilton. What kind of security commitment to 
Ukraine are we talking about here? 

Ms. Davis. We are talking about the kinds of security assurances 
that we provide to nonnuclear members of the NPT and to the as- 
surances that we provide as members of the CSCE. 

Chairman Hamilton. Well, what kind of assurances are we talk- 
ing about? 

Ms. Davis. It says that those states that are nonnuclear parties 
to the Nonproliferation Treaty can be assured that the nuclear 
weapons states will not use nuclear weapons or threaten their use 
against them. I think that is a very important step that Russia and 
the United States would be making 

Chairman Hamilton. We are not making any assurance against 
a conventional attack? 

Ms. Davis. At this point, we would be offering assurances of co- 
operation in times of threats to their security. 

Chairman Hamilton. What does that mean? 

Ms. Davis. They are not going to become members of NATO, Mr. 
Chairman, so we are not making the kinds of security commit- 
ments and guarantees that we have to our allies within that alli- 
ance. But again 

Chairman Hamilton. What does cooperation mean in that in- 
stance? Suppose Ukraine is attacked? What would our obligation 
be under the assurances you are talking about? 

Ms. Davis. We would hope that we would — would not find us in 
such a stark situation, but you are right to ask us clearly what it 
is that we would be saying to Ukraine. We would be saying to 
Ukraine, as we do to other members of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, that we would object and we would 
find fault with changes in boundaries not done by peaceful means. 



26 

But the kinds of security commitments that are part of our alHance 
with respect to NATO, are of a different order. 

Chairman Hamilton. But we would not be under any obhgation 
to send U.S. miHtary forces? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct. 

WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE 

Chairman Hamilton. Now, I understand our poHcy is to begin 
weapons dismantlement assistance to Ukraine before it ratines 
START or the NPT; is that correct? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct. 

Chairman Hamilton. And that is a change of policy from the 
previous administration. 

Ms. Davis. That is our current policy and that is our policy be- 
cause we believe that it is essential to begin the processes of dis- 
mantlement and that has our highest priority. 

Chairman Hamilton. You think that policy is working? 

Ms. Davis. Well, the first step was taken when Secretary Chris- 
topher visited Kiev and that is that Ukraine signed the umbrella 
agreement which is necessary to begin our assistance to their ef- 
forts to dismantle. 

Chairman Hamilton. OK Mr. Smith. 

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS POLICY 

Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary 
Davis, I would like to note that in your prepared testimony, you 
talk a great deal about nonproliferation goals with regards to the 
weapons of mass destruction. It seems to me, there is very little 
about conventional arms transfers proliferation other than as ap- 
plies to the administration's plans for a revamped COCOM. I would 
note parenthetically, that it was some $33 billion worth of foreign 
military sales in the last fiscal year, up from about $15 before that. 
My question is, especially since the President likewise in his Sep- 
tember 27 statement made very little reference to conventional 
arms transfers or sales, if you could address where the priority is. 
I know there has been an indication that there is some kind of a 
study that is underway. Could you elaborate on that substitute? 

Who is doing it? Where it is? When do you expect it to be com- 
pleted? 

And secondly, elaborate as well on the administration's view on 
conventional arms transfers. 

Ms. Davis. You were right to notice that I didn't have great de- 
tails with respect to our overall policies on arms transfers. The 
President has directed an interagency and NSC-directed study to 
lay out our overall policies, and we are working toward the goal of 
having that done by the end of this year. But let me say that one 
can have policies with respect to trade in arms before one has for- 
mal overall policies, and we have been working since we arrived to 
place restraints and get others to place restraints on sales to coun- 
tries of particular concern. Iran, Iraq we were talking about earlier. 

So I don't want to leave you the impression that just because we 
haven't completed our overall study that we haven't been taking 
this question seriously. But as you also know, the whole issue of 
arms trade gets into a balancing of a variety of different consider- 



27 

ations, having to do with nonproliferation, jobs at home, our indus- 
tries that produce arms, the whole set of transitions that they are 
going through. And so in our study, we will be seeking to balance 
those various considerations. 

ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST 

Mr. Smith. Let me ask you to focus briefly on the Middle East. 
Obviously, there is great deal of hope and expectation there with 
the recent signing between the PLO and Israel, but it would seem 
that the prospects of considerable arms sales to the Middle East 
will be unabated. Some industry analysts put it as high as $80 bil- 
lion pouring in over the next 5 years into the Middle East in terms 
of conventional arms. In your view, is that accurate, and what can 
we be doing or what should we be doing to try to curb that massive 
inflow of conventional armaments to the Middle East? 

Ms. Davis. I don't have those projections — ^but let me talk as to 
how I see the role of arms sales in that critical region. Arms sales 
are appropriate to responsible allies, and that is where our sales 
have been going in the follow-on to the Gulf War, and to allay the 
insecurities in the Middle East and the Gulf felt by the threats 
posed by Iran among other the states. So security is tied to respon- 
sible arms sales. And we certainly are going to continue to provide 
those to our key allies and friends in that region. 

But as we work through and accomplish what our goals with re- 
spect to bringing peace in that new environment are, clearly, we 
look at the kinds of sales that would be appropriate. So the answer 
to your question is the Middle East peace process is a real oppor- 
tunity to bring peace, and in that context, there is a role for arms 
control. 

There is a role for arms restraint, but let no one doubt that we 
would be prepared to transfer those arms necessary for the security 
of our friends and allies in that region. 

Mr. Smith. One final question, if I could? 

Chairman Hamilton. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Smith. I would be happy to yield. 

Chairman Hamilton. Madam Secretary, we are pouring arms 
into the Middle East. Do you find it difficult to urge others to prac- 
tice restraint in conventional arms sales around the world, or to 
the Middle East, given that we are such a massive seller of arms? 
How can we have credibility with other nations if we are ourselves 
a major exporter of arms? 

Ms. Davis. We can have credibility by the fact that the transfers 
that we are making are for legitimate security reasons and they 
are not done to those countries that 

Chairman Hamilton. Madam Secretary, I have never heard of 
an arms sale being made that wasn't justified on the basis of a le- 
gitimate national security need. 

Ms. Davis. I would hope that that would be 

Chairman Hamilton. That is an automatic rationale for every 
sale. I am just asking, if we pour these arms in ourselves, do you 
find that a handicap as you urge other nations to restrain arms 
sales? 

Ms. Davis. Some will use that argument against our proposals, 
but again it is in the — it is in the context of now we see security, 



28 

how what we restrain contributes to security and peace, and how 
in a multilateral way among the major suppliers that together we 
can use our policies with respect to sales and to their restraint to 
assert peace and security. That would be 

PROSPECTS FOR RESTRAINT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS 

Chairman Hamilton. What kind of progress are you making in 
getting the suppliers to restrain conventional arms sales? 

Ms. Davis. So far, we are working simply for a regime in which 
we would consult, in which there would be prior notification of 
sales, there would be information sharing. That in my view, Mr. 
Chairman, is the very important first step, and on the basis of 
that 

Chairman Hamilton. That is working now, is it? There is a 
prenotification procedure in place among tne principal suppliers? 

Ms. Davis. No. These are the goals we are seeking as we put in 
place a successor regime to COCOM. 

Chairman Hamilton. I see. Do you expect to get that 
prenotification regime in? 

Ms. Davis. Let me say, I am still of the view that I can succeed, 
but I am not there yet. 

Chairman Hamilton. We have had negotiations among the per- 
manent five on conventional arms transfers. Are those talks still 
going forward? 

Ms. Davis. Those talks have been stalled by the fact that the 
Chinese withdrew from such talks following on the sale of F-16's 
to Taiwan. 

Chairman Hamilton. Do you have any plans for reviving those 
talks? 

Ms. Davis. Rather than reviving the talks among the five, we see 
the successor regime to COCOM as the appropriate group that 
would now seek the kinds of consultations and prior notification 
that I just described. So we wouldn't just have the five who supply 
arms but the major suppliers which goes beyond the five. 

Chairman HAMILTON. So you are folding that permanent five ne- 
gotiation into the negotiations for a successor to COCOM. 

Ms. Davis. As a way of moving beyond that set of discussions 
that had essentially stalled by the fact that the Chinese were not 
participating. 

SALE OF RUSSIAN SUBMARINES TO IRAN 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Smith, I am intruding on your time. 
Let me ask one other question. We have been very exercised about 
the sale of submarines by Russia to Iran. Russia says that is a le- 
gitimate sale for legitimate self-defense purposes there. 

Are we in any way undercut when we object to the Russians 
about that sale, ^ven our own sales to the region? 

Ms. Davis. It is not a question of whether they come back with 
that but whether or not we seek 

Chairman Hamilton. That is not my question. 

Ms. Davis. We can have debating points but the real point here 
is 

Chairman Hamilton. I am asking what the Russians say? Do 
they raise that question? 



29 

Ms. Davis. They would use that argument, and it is not persua- 
sive. And I don't think that 

Chairman Hamilton. And if it is not persuasive? 

Ms. Davis. Because the dangers Iran poses are very serious and 
we seek to keep the trade in arms to Iran from occurring. 

Chairman Hamilton. That is not persuasive to the Russians, I 
presume? 

Ms. Davis. Well, at this point, they still are trading in arms with 
Iran. But one of our goals, again with respect to the follow-on re- 
gime in COCOM, where we hope very much that Russia will par- 
ticipate, that part of that regime will be a policy of restraint in 
arms trade to Iran, 

PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS 

Chairman HAMILTON. I noticed in the President's September 27 
proposal, there is no initiative there with respect to conventional 
arms, other than to conduct a studv. That would suggest to me that 
you don't rank very highly the problem of conventional arms trans- 
fers. And, of course, the obvious point is that most wars are fought 
with conventional arms. That is where the real dangers are or have 
been in the past. 

Ms. Davis. I am not sure I would agree with you that those are 
the most serious dangers. 

Chairman Hamilton. Well, those are the types of weapons that 
kill the most people, aren't they? 

Ms. Davis. PartW because we have been successful in preventing 
the proliferation of even more dangerous arms: nuclear weapons. 

Chairman Hamilton. Doesn't that mean you have to pay some 
attention to conventional arms transfers and do something more 
than just study the problem? 

Ms. Davis. I hope that by "our studying," doesn't suggest that we 
don't care about it. 

Chairman Hamilton. Do you have a program to follow through? 

Ms. Davis. We have a study and we will 

Chairman Hamilton. When will you have recommendations on 
that study? 

Ms. Davis. We are aiming for the end of the year. 

Chairman Hamilton. Very good. I look forward to seeing them. 

Mr. Smith, I thank you for your courtesies here. 

PROSPECTS FOR POST-COCOM CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL 

Mr. Smith. Thank you. I appreciate your questions, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

Secretary Davis, let me just ask you if the administration contin- 
ues to focus on conventional arms sales issues in the context of an 
export control agreement to replace COCOM, do we risk losing our 
objective in the export control area, in your view? 

Ms. Davis. I think this is the way oy which we accomplish our 
objectives because it is very hard to do this alone. The new world 
is a world in which many produce these technologies and ulti- 
mately can produce these arms, so it is really working together 
that we will be successful without saying that we won't take these 
steps necessarily ourselves were we to see some very dangerous 
things happening. 



76-043 0-94-3 



30 

RECONCILING ARMS SALES WITH ARMS CONTROL 

Mr. Smith. One thing, and just to pick up on what the chairman 
was saying, because I was focusing on conventional arms myself 
and the seeming lack of focus on that. 

How do our allies regard the United States when we preach non- 
proliferation and talk about it and then set records for actually 
selling those arms? As the chairman pointed out, every arms sale 
has some kind of national securitization rationale affixed to it. And 
you did mention there is that domestic job issue which, obviously, 
when you get beyond our own borders, has absolutely no moral 
suasion or any other suasion you could give to it. What do you say? 
You could argue that we arm the world and then we talk non- 
proliferation. 

Ms. Davis. Well, I think when we think about our policies for the 
sales of arms, which I was describing to you earlier, a number of 
considerations come to play and we need to balance those off. These 
are clearlv part of the balancing that the Secretary and the Presi- 
dent do. And so it is hard for me in the abstract to talk about over- 
all levels in general conversations that we have about arms re- 
straint. I think is is more important to look at dangers, to look at 
particular policies tailored to those dangers, and I think you will 
find us having a very good record in focusing on Iran, Iraq, particu- 
larly, trying to bring a restraint regime to these regions of the 
world. 

URGING RESTRAINT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES 

Mr. Smith. Well, just two final questions. The chairman pointed 
out that the wars that are going on today are being obviously pros- 
ecuted with the use of conventional arms. I remember how it dis- 
turbed me to no end when I was in Bjelovar and Sisak in the 
former Yugoslavia, and MiG's were flying overhead as Congress- 
man Frank Wolf and I were there. We went and observed firsthand 
and photographed bomb fragments of U.S. -made 500-pound bombs 
that had been used by the Serbian military to kill civilians. And 
it raised again anew the prospects of who may be our friends now, 
and sometime in the not too distant future, could be our enemies, 
or the enemies of our friends. And you know the big picture of arm- 
ing the world ad nauseam does greatly disturb me. 

CHINESE CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES 

And one final question, if I could. The administration has right- 
fully and with appropriate alarm, raised concerns about China's 
technological transfer of missile technology issues, the detonation 
of a nuclear weapon. Are there any Chinese acquisitions or sales 
of conventional arms that caused the administration concern? 

Ms. Davis. Again, we do, when we talk with the Chinese, and 
this is one of the reasons that we have sought to revive the talks 
on conventional arms in the P-5, and they have rejected that, so 
I didn't want to leave the impression that we don't care about con- 
versations with the Chinese on conventional arms, we do. And in 
areas, particularly with Iran, we raise our concerns. 

So the answer to your question is that we have a nonprolifera- 
tion policy with respect to China that covers the full range of ac- 



31 

tivities. We have just given priority to two that we thought particu- 
larly dangerous. 

Mr. Smith. I thank you. I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Hamilton. You yield back the balance of your time? 

Mr. Smith. Right. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Oilman. 

STATEMENT OF MR. OILMAN 

Mr. Oilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I join in welcoming Under Secretary Davis and representatives 
from the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Energy, and ACDA 
to the committee testifying on this important issue of nonprolifera- 
tion. 

As I have said on other occasions, there is no more critical threat 
facing our Nation than the proliferation of not only weapons of 
mass destruction but also of conventional arms. 

Whether it be the grave situation in North Korea or the continu- 
ing problems in getting programs underway in the former Soviet 
Union, or the troubling levels of worldwide conventional arms 
transfers, it is absolutely fundamental that we get this policy right. 

The problem with North Korea has reached a particularly acute 
stage. I think there is general agreement in the Congress that 
North Korea must not be allowed to succeed in its efforts to de- 
velop nuclear weapons and that we must make clear the serious- 
ness with which we view this problem. 

I am introducing legislation today that is very important to sup- 
port the President s efforts to rein in the North Korean nuclear pro- 
gram. My legislation not only expresses congressional support for 
the steps the President has undertaken but also approves and en- 
courages use by him of any additional means necessary to prevent 
the development, acquisition, or use by North Korea of any nuclear 
weaponry. I hope my legislation receives the support of the admin- 
istration as well as my colleagues. 

I was pleased to note both the President's remarks before the 
U.N. on this subject, as well as the inclusion of nonproliferation in 
Secretary Christopher's "six priorities of U.S. foreign policy." How- 
ever, I feel compelled to say that I am disappointed it took the ad- 
ministration nearly 9 months to articulate its overall policy objec- 
tives, and certainly many, if not most, of the critical details have 
yet to come. 

Secretary Davis, I would also like to note that your prepared tes- 
timony discusses extensively nonproliferation goals with regard to 
weapons of mass destruction but very little about conventional 
arms transfer and its proliferation, other than as applies to the ad- 
ministration's plans for a revamped COCOM. 

The President also gave this issue very little attention in his 
speech to the U.N. Greneral Assembly other than indicating that 
our Nation will undertake a comprehensive review of conventional 
arms transfer policy. 

Accordingly, I would like to address a few questions in that direc- 
tion today. Again, I thank you for coming before the committee 
with your staff. 



32 

OSLO MEETING ON SUCCESSOR REGIME TO COCOM 

Mr. Oilman. Secretary Davis, are you prepared to brief our staff 
in regard to the recent Oslo meeting concerning the follow-on re- 
gime to COCOM? 

Ms. Davis. We would be happy to brief your staff in some detail 
Congressman Oilman, and indeed we have a number of high-level 
meetings in the coming weeks in which we hope to bring to conclu- 
sion our efforts with respect to future constraints on strategic 
trade. 

Mr. Oilman. Well, we understand the press reports are now cir- 
culating describing that meeting and we would welcome an early 
briefing to our people with regard to that. 

RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH MTCR 

Could you describe for the committee the extent of Russian Chi- 
nese cooperation in strategic matters including the transfer of ma- 
terials governed by the Missile Technology Control Regime, co- 
operation in nuclear testing, sharing of design information on re- 
entry vehicles, et cetera. Didn't the administration earlier this year 
notify the Congress of a violation of the MTCR by Russia in that 
area, and what can you tell us about the follow-up on that? 

Ms. Davis. We did, under the provisions of the legislation, report 
to Congress a finding that that particular activity had occurred, 
but following on the Russian Oovernment's negotiation of a bilat- 
eral agreement between the United States and Russia in which 
they committed to carrying out the provisions of the MTCR from 
the 1st of November, we waived the sanctions under the law con- 
sistent with the goals of that law, which is to keep and to prevent 
the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies to countries 
which today don't have such missiles and missile technology. 

Mr. Oilman. For how long a period of time did we grant the 
waiver? 

Ms. Davis. Well, the waiver continues now as long as the Rus- 
sians are in compliance with the provisions of the MTCR regime. 

Mr. Oilman. Are you providing oversight with regard to their 
continuation of compliance? 

Ms. Davis. It is very high on my list of activities. And indeed, 
through discussions and technical interchanges between our t^vo 
countries, we are working through the details by which they will 
carry out the provisions of that regime and, indeed, had very good 
conversations most recently in Moscow when I was there with the 
Secretary. 

Mr. Oilman. Are you satisfied they are complying now? 

Ms. Davis. I am now satisfied that they are. We are working to- 
gether, though, to ensure that for the future. 

THE FUTURE OF MTCR 

Mr. Oilman. What is our policy vision for the future of the Mis- 
sile Technology Control Regime? Do you plan to seek expansion of 
MTCR to be a tighter, more inclusive regime, and has MTCR been 
an effective regime to halt the proliferation of missile technology? 

Ms. Davis. Well, as I said in my prepared statement, we are 
looking to a regime in the future that goes beyond simply control- 



33 

ling individually our trade in missile and missile technologies by 
partners, to a regime that would be more active and working to- 
gether as a team to prevent that proliferation. So we wish to give 
the regime energy and we wish to give it a set of activities, both 
to encourage other countries not to trade in these kinds of missiles 
and missile technologies, but also possibly to bring costs to bear for 
those who carry out those activities. 

POLICY ON SPACE-LAUNCH VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY 

Mr. Oilman. Secretary Davis, can you tell us how the adminis- 
tration is setting policy concerning the export of space-launch vehi- 
cle technology to try to limit the possibility of those exports being 
used for weapon purposes? What is your strategy for allowing 
MTCR parties to have access to U.S. space-launch vehicle tech- 
nology and prevent reduced proliferation risks? 

One further thought with regard to that, is your basic tradeoff 
to create incentives for parties to join the MTCR by allowing them 
access to U.S. space-launch technology? 

Ms. Davis. Our goal is very much as it has been in the past, and 
that is to prevent the transfer of missiles and missile technologies, 
set our sights on that as our goal, and that is unchanged. Indeed, 
we believe that over the past few months that we have given en- 
ergy to that particular set of goals. 

We have demonstrated that we are prepared to raise the costs 
to those who violate the provisions of that regime. So the direction 
of your questioning might suggest that we are in some ways lessen- 
ing our commitment to that or to our goals. And in no way is this 
administration doing that with respect to the MTCR regime. 

determination on CHINESE VIOLATION OF MTCR 

Mr. Oilman. Can you tell us exactly what determination the ad- 
ministration has made in the case of China and the MTCR? And 
what sanctions have been invoked and which American companies 
are hit by those sanctions? Why is it taking so long to make a de- 
termination? Can you tell us when you expect a decision? 

Ms. Davis. There has been no time since the determination in 
which the sanctions have not gone into place, so let me just begin 
by saying that we made the determination in August, that activi- 
ties inconsistent with the MTCR regime and also inconsistent with 
our legislation had occurred, and by that determination, Category 
II sanctions are in place. And so at this point, I can say that there 
has been no lag in carrying out the law. 

At the same time, we said to the Chinese Oovernment, that 
under the provisions of that law, were they to come into compliance 
with the regime and also to end any transfers to Pakistan, that we 
would place ourselves in a position to waive those sanctions. So the 
policy stands from the time of its determination. 

SANCTIONS ON SATELLITE COMPONENTS INTENDED FOR CHINESE 

SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES 

Mr. Oilman. Secretary Davis, on October 25, in a briefing, you 
noted that regarding the imposition of sanctions against China and 
Pakistan, you said that the best way to — well, let me just get to 



34 

the important part. Apart from the legal statement, let me tell you 
what is going to be the effect, and that is for satellite components 
that will be laimched on Chinese launchers or boosters, license for 
these activities will be denied over the coming 2 years. 

Does your statement still hold? 

Ms. Davis. I think the statement follows from the law in which 
the sanctioned activities require us to deny new export licenses for 
MTCR-annexed items, both munitions and dual-use items. So con- 
sistent with the law and consistent with that statement, we will be 
carrying out the licensing consistent with the practices of the State 
Department and the Commerce Department. 

Mr. Oilman. When do you anticipate that those regulations will 
be issued? 

Ms. Davis. It is not a question of issuing regulations, it is a ques- 
tion of responding to licenses as they come to each of these Depart- 
ments. 

Mr. Oilman. Are there any license applications now? 

Ms. Davis. I would like to take that for the record and only to 
say that I can assure you that we are carrying out the sanctions 
as required by the law. 

[The information follows:] 

Since the announcement of the missile proliferation sanctions against specified 
Chinese entities and governmental activities, the Office of Defense Trade Controls 
has "returned without action" six license applications falling within the purview of 
the sanctions. There are no applications pending before the Office of Defense Trade 
Controls which fall clearly within the purview of the sanctions. 

NUMBER OF EXPORT LICENSES DENIED SINCE IMPOSITION OF 

SANCTIONS ON CHINA 

Mr. Oilman. Well, are there any licenses that have been denied 
as a result of these violations? 

Ms. Davis. No licenses have been permitted since the determina- 
tion of those sanctions. 

Mr. Oilman. How many are pending? 

Ms. Davis. My recollection is there are some six but let me again 
provide that for the record. 

Mr. Oilman. With that, Mr. Chairman, I request that the re- 
sponse be submitted for the record and be included in the record. 

Chgiirman Hamilton. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

The Office of Defense Trade Controls reviews license applications on an ongoing 
basis to determine whether they fall within the scope of the sanctions. As of Novem- 
ber 29, one application was under review to determine whether it is covered by the 
sanctions. 

PROPOSED AIRCRAFT SALE TO ISRAEL 

Mr. Oilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just one last question. Madam Secretan^, do you plan to notify 
Congress in the coming weeks or months about a proposed F-15 or 
F-16 package to Israel? 

Ms. Davis. I was asked earlier. Congressman, as to who has re- 
sponsibility from the government for various activities. Coming up 
to me will be a proposal — coming to me are proposals for such 



35 

transfers. None has come to me and so I would wish not to make 
any projections or promises with respect to that. 

Mr. Oilman. Are you saying that you don't have such a proposal 
before you? 

Ms. Davis. I do not have today such a proposal before me. I un- 
derstand that these are very much under consideration. The nar- 
row statement that I have made to you is that I, myself, haven't 
received the proposals in this regard. 

U.S. COMPANIES AFFECTED BY SANCTIONS ON CHINA 

Chairman Hamilton. Would the gentleman yield a moment? 

Mr. Oilman. Yes, I would be pleased to yield. 

Chairman Hamilton. I wanted to go back to your question on 
sanctions with respect to China. 

What American companies are hit by those sanctions? 

Ms. Davis. Let me — let me begin by saying that under the legis- 
lation which calls for these sanctions, the legislation specifically 
says that the economic impact of sanctions cannot be a part of de- 
termination. The determination needs to be made when the evi- 
dence is there that such activities have occurred. And so in making 
this determination, I didn't have before me the list of companies 
and the particular activities that would be sanctioned. That follows 
on from the determination, so . don't hold in my head the names 
of the companies or the specific licenses that are out there. I can 
provide that for the record if you would wish. 

[The information follows:] 

The Office of Defense Trade Controls has "returned without action" applications 
from the following companies in accordance with the sanctions: Hughes Aircraft, 
Martin Marietta, and Scientific Atlanta. 

Chairman Hamilton. Isn't the Hughes Company one of them? 

Ms. Davis. There are satellites that Hughes makes. There are 
satellites that other companies make as well. 

Chairman Hamilton. Isn't Hughes one of them? 

Ms. Davis. Hughes I believe is one of these. 

Chairman Hamilton. Is Hughes the most important one? 

Ms. Davis. I don't know how one would judge the relative impor- 
tance. 

Chairman Hamilton. Well, dollar volume would be one way. 

Ms. Davis. It might be and again, Mr. Chairman, I don't have 
this in my head and would have to provide that for you. 

Chairman Hamilton. You do not know whether Hughes is the 
top company involved here by dollar volume standard, for example? 

Ms. Davis. I do not know that, but I can provide you that. 

[The information follows:] 

The value of the Hughes licenses which the OfTice of Defense Trade Controls has 
"returned without action" exceeds that of other U.S. firms' Ucenses. The specific dol- 
lar amounts of the licenses are proprietary data and cannot be disclosed. 

Chairman Hamilton. What other company might be involved? 

Ms. Davis. Martin-Marietta might have some satellites, and 
there is — there could be some other firms that in the course of 
these 2 years had either satellites or items on this list of exports 
which would be denied under the sanctions provision. 



36 

STATUS OF EXPORT LISCENSE APPLICATIONS FOR MTCR-ANNEXED 

ITEMS 

Chairman Hamilton. When are you going to make a decision? 

Ms. Davis. I am not sure which decision you are referring to. 

Chairman Hamilton. Well, are you 

Ms. Davis. The sanctions are in place, Mr. Chairman. We have 
made that determination. 

Chairman Hamilton. So you are denying Hughes, at this point, 
the ability to export to China? 

Ms. Davis. We are required under the law to deny new export 
licenses for MTCR-annex items. We are carrying out the law. 

Chairman Hamilton. So it is not even under review at this 
point? A determination has been made, Hughes will not make the 
sale, period; is that correct? 

Ms. Davis. That is not what I said. I have said that Hughes 

Chairman Hamilton. I am trying to understand. You said that 
there was no decision to be made. Hughes cannot make the sale 
under the law, and you are not reviewing it. It is just a fait 
accompli. Is that right? 

Ms. Davis. I am being hesitant not because I — it is just not for 
me to make that determination. The law says that we will deny li- 
censes for entities that have MTCR items. The second point is 
when the licenses 

Chairman Hamilton. I am trying to understand this. The law 
applies to Hughes. They cannot sell. Is that the status of the law? 

Ms. Davis. It would depend on what it is that Hughes was ask- 
ing to license. If they are asking to license a satellite that includes 
items that are denied by the State Department, they will not be 
able to make that sale. But I don't believe, Mr. Chairman, that 
they have brought those licenses up for review. 

AGENCY JURISDICTION FOR EXPORT LICENSE APPROVAL 

Chairman Hamilton. Now, the Commerce Department is looking 
at this; are they? 

Ms. Davis. llie Commerce Department also 

Chairman Hamilton. Who is the spokesmen for the Commerce 
Department here? What is the status of this sale by Hughes, Mr. 
Clements? 

Mr. Clements. Mr. Chairman, currently these matters are under 
the sole prerogative of the Department of State because they are 
licensed by the State Department. They are not licensed by the 
Commerce Department. 

Chairman Hamilton. So you are playing no role in it? 

Mr. Clements. We generally do not play a direct role in the li- 
censes for munition items, no. 

Chairman Hamilton. What do you mean "generally"? I am talk- 
ing specifically. 

Mr. Clements. In this case, no. 

Chairman Hamilton. You have no role in this case? Commerce 
has played no role here? 

Mr. Clements. In the consideration of these licenses, no. 

Chairman Hamilton. For Hughes? 

Mr. Clements. That is correct. 



37 

Chairman Hamilton. And so far as you are concerned, the deci- 
sion rests with State, and the President, of course? 

Mr. Clements. Under the current state of regulations, those h- 
censes have to be issued by the Department of State. 

Ms. Davis. Are you asking, Mr. Chairman 

Chairman Hamilton. Did you know anything about this sale? 

Mr. Clements. Mr. Chairman, we are not aware of the status of 
the consideration of the licenses within the Department of State. 
Hughes does not come to the Department of Commerce because 
they do not require Department of Commerce authorization in 
order to export those satellites. 

Ms. Davis. Also, Mr. Chairman 

law mandates denial of export license for hughes satellites 

Chairman HAMILTON. What I am trying to understand is the gov- 
ernment denjdng Hughes the opportunity to sell these satellites to 
China. 

Ms. Davis. The administration is carrying out the law having 
made the sanctions determination and that is to deny new export 
licenses for MTCR-annex items. 

Chairman HAMILTON. And that applies to Hughes? 

Ms. Davis. And that applies to Hughes, although, Mr. Chairman, 
I don't believe the licenses 

Chairman Hamilton. Now, that decision is not under review. It 
has been made. You feel compelled to do that, I think I understood 
you to say a moment ago, by the law? 

Ms. Davis. I do. 

Chairman Hamilton. And so there is no further decision to be 
made. Hughes is out of the game? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct, as long as they are — the reason I am 
not being as precise as you would wish me to be, perhaps, is the 
sanctions apply to MTCR-annex items so there are activities that 
Hughes could be carrying out that wouldn't fall under this sanc- 
tion. 

Chairman Hamilton. But what they have asked to sell would 
come under these sanctions; is that correct? 

Ms. Davis. Satellites with MTCR-annex items that come before 
the State Department will be denied. 

Chairman Hamilton. And have been denied? 

Ms. Davis. I don't believe they have come. Were they to come, 
they would be denied. 

Chairman HAMILTON. They would be denied. And the decision is 
not under review? 

Ms. Davis. The decision isn't under review. 

Chairman HAMILTON. If I understood you correctly, you don't feel 
like you have any discretion. 

Ms. Davis. I do not believe under the law that I have any discre- 
tion. Can I try a somewhat more philosophical response because I 
think in this case the law provides us with no flexibility? It cer- 
tainly doesn't provide us with any flexibility in making a deter- 
mination under the law with respect to its economic effects. It has 
had the consequence of affecting American jobs and I would like to 
work with the committee to be sure that we and the committee are 



38 

both comfortable with the character of our goals and the sanctions 
that are required to meet those goals. 

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN THE LAW 

Chairman Hamilton. Are you recommending any change in the 
law? 

Ms. Davis. I am not making any recommendation, but I think it 
is time to 

Chairman Hamilton. Are you satisfied with the law? 

Ms. Davis. I inherited the law and I have been carrying out the 
law, and it is clearly the case 

Chairman Hamilton. But if that law works against U.S. com- 
mercial interests, you would recommend a change; would you not? 

Ms. Davis. I believe it serves our nonproliferation goals, and I 
am confident that those goals are critical to our national security 
and we need to accomplish those goals. The effect of the particular 
regime of sanctions may have consequences that we ought to think 
again about, given that it is having an effect on American jobs. 

Chairman Hamilton. So are you reviewing possible amendments 
or modifications to the law? 

Ms. Davis. We started to talk with your staff, Mr. Chairman, 
about this legislation and how we view it, now having come 
through these various diplomatic efforts to accomplish our goals, 
these nonproliferation goals that are central to our administration 
and also central to this legislation. 

Chairman Hamilton. So you are looking at modifications of the 
law? 

Ms. Davis. We would like to come in and begin to talk to you 
about this, but I don't have a view at this point and I don't think 
it is appropriate to have a view at this point. 

Chairman Hamilton. OK 

Mr. Royce. 

items subject to mtcr-related sanctions 

Mr. Oilman. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Hamilton. I am sorry. I took Mr. Oilman's time. I 
apologize. 

Mr. Oilman. Thank you, Mr. Royce. 

Just one or two questions. 

Madam Secretary, if you are going to propose any rewrite of the 
law, I just would like to remind you that our staffs are beginning 
to work on the new foreign aid measure now and will be doing sub- 
stantial work between now and January, so we would hope that 
you would come forward at an early date. 

Let me just understand something. Are satellites now under the 
MTCR, the jurisdiction of MTCR? 

Ms. Davis. Let me ask you to — again, I am not a lawyer so I 
don't know precisely what you are trying to ask. 

Mr. Oilman. Tell us what is in your mind and let us hear what 
your concerns are. 

Ms. Davis. Satellites are not listed as an item in the guidelines 
and provisions and annex of MTCR, but items on that list can often 
be in satellites. 



39 

Mr. Oilman. So the component parts are on the list but the sat- 
ellite is itself is not, that is what you are saying? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct. 

Mr. Oilman. That doesn't seem to make sense. 

Ms. Davis. Truthfully, I didn't write the annex to this particular 
provision, but I think what they were trying to get at were the 
kinds of items that contribute to the making of missiles and tech- 
nologies, and a satellite, as a whole, doesn't itself — is not a missile 
and it is not itself a direct contributor, but items embedded within 
a satellite, taken out of a satellite and then put into a missile, can 
be turned 

Mr. Oilman. Is Hughes' application for building a satellite? 

Ms. Davis. Yes. 

Mr. Oilman. Yet you deny them a license because the component 
parts could be used for something else? 

Ms. Davis. Because the law requires us to once sanctions are de- 
termined, once a violation is determined and sanctions go in, that 
is what the law requires. 

Mr. Oilman. Well, assume that Hughes company, or whatever 
other company, could satisfy the licensing people that all of the 
component parts are going to be used for a satellite and not for any 
missile technology, would you then be in a position to issue a li- 
cense? 

Ms. Davis. I could ask you and those of you who drafted this law, 
whether that was how you saw the intent, but the law itself doesn't 
suggest that I have that much — that I have that much flexibility. 

Mr. Oilman. It would seem to me that rational reasoning would 
apply here if the company can show, whatever company it may be, 
that what they are doing is manufacturing a satellite and not man- 
ufacturing any missiles, that there ought to be some discretion in 
your review. 

Ms. Davis. So that we can work together to make sure that the 
legislation is consistent with the goals that we would wish. 

FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXPORT LICENSE DENL\L 

Mr. Oilman. I hope we can do that, because it would seem to 
me — do we have any idea what the cost estimate is for Hughes 
being denied satellite production? 

Ms. Davis. I don't have that myself, I am afraid. And, again, it 
would depend on what precisely they would be wishing to apply in 
terms of licenses. 

Mr. Oilman. Didn't you make some estimate in your October 
25th briefing of some $400 to $500 million as the cost of the loss 
of this satellite production? 

Ms. Davis. That wasn't Hughes specific. That was a general 
sense of what the implications would be, absent changes in the 
market and this was looking back at the kinds of activities and 
then projecting those forward. 

Mr. Oilman. I hope we can we define these things, and at the 
same time, prevent missile proliferation, and at the same time, 
allow the reasonable production of satellites within our country, 
and we look forward to working with you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 



40 

RATIONALE FOR EXPORT LICENSE DENIAL 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Oilman. 

I want to pursue this one more time. I am still wrestling with 
this thing. 

Satellites from Hughes were sold to third countries, as I under- 
stand it. And those satellites were to be launched on Chinese mis- 
siles. Hughes contends that these satellites are not transferred to 
China? 

Am I correct in my understanding that they are simply launched 
on Chinese missiles? 

Ms. Davis. Right. 

Chairman Hamilton. Your contention is that the satellites are, 
in fact, transferred to China; is that right? 

Ms. Davis. That is the interpretation that we are making. 

Chairman Hamilton. And 

Ms. Davis. Because they come under — I mean, this is a contract 
with China, so again I only — I tell you I am not a lawyer and this 
is a matter of legal interpretation. Clearly, the lawyers have spent 
some considerable time with this, but again I think what we need 
to think about is that we were serving our overall nonproliferation 
goals. What China had done was inconsistent with those, and very 
dangerous. And this occurred with Pakistan, in a part of the world 
where we already worry about the development of weapons of mass 
destruction. 

Chairman Hamilton. All right. 

Mr. Royce. 

ASSESSING NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY 

Mr. RoYCE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, 

Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, when he testi- 
fied earlier in the year, indicated at that time, I think his words 
were that the North Koreans probably, probably had the material 
right now to build at least one bomb. 

Now, you are apparently of the opinion that they are no longer 
developing nuclear material, but let me ask you what assurances 
you could give us that they are not at this time using the material 
that they already have to build that bomb? 

Ms. Davis. The material that you refer to and formed the basis 
of Mr. Woolsey's statement, derives from the discrepancies that the 
IAEA had found in the reporting and which led the IAEA to re- 
quest these special inspections. These special inspections have not 
occurred. And while we don't have any direct way of discovering 
what they are doing with this material, obviously, our concerns 
about that have led us to support very strongly the IAEA in wish- 
ing to carry out those inspections. 

ASSESSING NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE TO IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS 

Mr. RoYCE. Well, what is your assessment, if I could ask, of what 
the North Korean response would be if you were to support sanc- 
tions against North Korea until such time as you get those inspec- 
tions? 



41 

Ms. Davis. It is very hard for me to predict the reaction. More 
importantly, it is very important for North Korea to 
understand 

Mr. RoYCE. I understand that, but I am just asking, have you 
made an assessment? Is there an assessment? 

Ms. Davis. Because of the isolation and the uncertainties sur- 
rounding that regime and what we know about that regime, we see 
dangers if we move to a confrontation. On the other hand, we are 
not going to allow the possibility of those dangers to stand in the 
way of doing what is necessary to carry out our obligations both 
with respect to the Nonproliferation Treatv and with respect to pre- 
venting North Korea from developing the Domb. 

Mr. KOYCE. For your own edincation, it seems to me that what 
we are doing here is just treading water. That statement does not 
answer the question even if we have made an assessment and what 
we intend to do. 

Ms. Davis. I don't think we are treading water. And let me be 
quite clear, we have pursued diplomacy to this point under the con- 
dition that North Korea has suspended its withdrawal from the 
NPT and with confidence that they are not further developing nu- 
clear material, so we are not treading water. We are seeking to 
keep North Korea carrying out its obligations. And when we deter- 
mine that they failed to do that, we have said, and others in the 
international community have said that we will take this to the Se- 
curity Council, with the next step being sanctions. So we are not 
treading water. 

Mr. RoYCE. And the bottom line is in the meantime we can't give 
any assurances to anybody that they are not using that material 
right now to build a bomb, and I just want to point that out. 

Ms. Davis. That is consistent with what the intelligence commu- 
nity would say to you as well. 

Mr. RoYCE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATOR 

Chairman Hamilton. Has a comprehensive test ban negotiator 
been named yet, a chief negotiator? 

Ms. Davis. We are proceeding to begin negotiations in the Con- 
ference on Disarmament in January of 1994. Our current Ambas- 
sador, Ambassador Ledogar will be conducting those negotiations 
in that forum. Prior to tnat, I have been leading an interagency 
team seeking to put together the elements of our proposals that we 
would introduce at the time that those negotiations get underway. 

Chairman Hamilton. So we have not yet appointed a 

Ms. Davis. No, we have. Ambassador Ledogar will be conducting 
the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. 

Chairman Hamilton. He has been named as negotiator, is that 
it? 

Ms. Davis. He is our negotiator. 

TIMEFRAME ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS 

Chairman Hamilton. What is the time line on those negotia- 
tions? 
Ms. Davis. Well, we 



42 

Chairman Hamilton. Are we going to have an agreement by 
1995, of the NPT Review Conference, for example? 

Ms. Davis. We wouldn't wish to link the two that closely so that 
we hold one hostage to the other. Our goal is to have — ^to be as far 
along as we can by 1995. I would hope to have the elements of such 
a treaty in our overall goal, a treaty ready for ratification by 1996. 

Chairman Hamilton. Those negotiations take place in Geneva, 
the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, is that right? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct. 

STATUS OF TESTING MORATORIUM 

Chairman Hamilton. Now, we have a testing moratorium in 
place. Have other governments endorsed that? Are there some gov- 
ernments that have not endorsed it? 

Ms. Davis. A moratorium has been endorsed by the United 
States, Russia, the U.K, and most recently by France extending 
their commitment that President Mitterrand has made. The Chi- 
nese have not joined in that moratorium, but in a resolution soon 
to be passed by the United Nations General Assembly, a consensus 
resolution will indicate, I believe, that restraint in testing serves 
our goals of negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 

Chairman Hamilton. Do you have any reason to think that 
China is going to continue its nuclear tests? 

Ms. Davis. The Chinese said they are not prepared to enter into 
a moratorium. They understand that we would wish them not to 
continue testing. We would wish that they exercise the restraint 
currently being shown by the other nuclear powers. 

But I think, Mr. Chairman, we can't let this issue stand in the 
way of making good on the Chinese commitment made publicly at 
the time of their recent test, that they wish to negotiate a com- 
prehensive test ban by 1996 as well. 

Chairman Hamilton. Well, what is your strategy for getting 
China to stop further nuclear testing? How are you dealing with 
that problem? 

Ms. Davis. Well, in the first instance, we are consulting and 
working closely with them toward the accomplishment of a test ban 
treaty in which there would then be no further testing. So that is 
our overall goal and in the interim, we are seeking both bilaterally 
and through the support of others in the international community 
that they exercise restraint. 

Chairman Hamilton. What has been the Chinese response? 
Have they said they are going to go ahead and test or are they 
going to consider this request for restraint? 

Ms. Davis. They have responded by suggesting they have done 
a very small number of nuclear tests, far smaller than the other 
nuclear powers, and they believe that they may wish to continue 
to do some testing in coming years. But again, importantly, they 
have committed themselves publicly now to a treaty in 1996. 

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Royce, do you have further questions? 

FRENCH AND GERMAN SATELLITES ON CHINESE SPACE LAUNCH 

VEHICLES 

Mr. RoYCE. Mr. Chairman, just following up. 



43 

China and France, is it true that both countries have offered the 
same arrangement, the same satelhte arrangement with China 
that the United States is not pursuing? I mean, they are both 
members ofMTCR. 

Ms. Davis. The Chinese, unfortunately, are not members of 
MTCR 

Mr. ROYCE. Excuse me. The French and German companies, I as- 
sume with French and German governmental support, have made 
the offer, if I understand correctly, to the Chinese to step in and 
offer the same satellite arrangement? 

Ms. Davis. They don't have the same legislation that we have 
with respect to 

Mr. RoYCE. So even though they are members of MTCR, they are 
not bound or their governments perceive that their companies are 
not bound in the same way? 

Ms. Davis. They are not bound because the legislation under 
which we are denying these particular sales is our own unilateral 
legislation on the part of the U.S. Government. 

Mr. RoYCE. I see. I would point out that clearly France and Ger- 
many are not helping in this circumstance. I would just ask if 
you 

Ms. Davis. We have gone to France and Grermany and asked 
them not to undercut our policies and raised with them the dan- 
gers of what China has been doing and we have tried to gain their 
support. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

TIMEFRAME FOR PHASING OUT COCOM 

Chairman Hamilton. On the COCOM, they go out of business at 
the beginning of 1994; is that right? 

Ms. Davis. We haven't determined a time in which we would 
phaseout COCOM. Indeed, that is a question that has to do with 
how we put in place the successor regime. We have not ourselves 
committed to a successor to COCOM or those controls at this point, 
Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Hamilton. You expect COCOM to go out of business 
fairly soon? 

Ms. Davis. We see ourselves as phasing this out in the coming 
months, but I don't think we can say with precision exactly when 
that will occur. 

MEMBERSHIP IN SUCCESSOR REGIME TO COCOM 

Chairman Hamilton. And you are going to try to put in its place 
a new regime with former COCOM members and some of the East- 
ern European countries? 

Ms. Davis. The Newly Independent States, as well as Russia. We 
would see Russia as a partner. 

Chairman Hamilton. Russia as partner. Would China be a part 
of this new regime? 

Ms. Davis. We would set the same requirements for membership. 
These requirements would be nondiscriminatory in the sense of ad- 
herence to nonproliferation norms and adequate export controls. At 



44 

this point, China is not — its activities are not consistent with those 
standards. 

PROGRESS TOWARD ADOPTION OF NEW REGIME 

Chairman Hamilton. Now, you are going to focus in this new re- 
gime on this prenotification approach you were describing a Httle 
earlier, and I suppose with regard to certain countries, at least, 
just flat prohibitions with respect to arms sales? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct. 

Chairman Hamilton. Are most of the nations that we have 
worked with in COCOM, the British the French and the others, 
they are supportive of this new regime; are they? 

Ms. Davis. We are making progress but we are not there yet. 
Meetings will be held in the coming months in order to bring this 
to a conclusion. 

Chairman Hamilton. Why — do they have some hesitancy on this 
and if so, what is it? 

Ms. Davis. I think you know that some of our allies have always 
been hesitant with respect to discussions and consultations prior to 
the sales of arms as well as to the trade in dual-use technologies. 
That is simply a fact, but we believe that the dangers are such and 
the nature of the kinds of consultations and prior notifications that 
we are seeking are responsible ways to move in the new world. 

SUCESSOR regime TO BE BASED ON NATIONAL DISCRETION 

Chairman Hamilton. Now, under COCOM, the United States 
had a veto, in effect, on dual-use exports. 

Ms. Davis. It was regime of consensus and therefore 

Chairman Hamilton. It was veto operated, and the regime you 
are thinking of putting into place, would it also operate by consen- 
sus? 

Ms. Davis. No. It is going to work on the basis of national discre- 
tion and that, Mr. Chairman, is why we need to be absolutely con- 
fident that we have the right regime in place before we phaseout 
COCOM and end that consensual regime. 

Chairman Hamilton. Would we in this new regime, then, lose 
our veto? 

Ms. Davis. A follow-on to COCOM would not be a regime in 
which there will be consensus with respect to strategic trade. 

Chairman Hamilton. So, in effect, we would not have a veto? 

Ms. Davis. That is correct. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of 
goals with respect to this regime, but that one I fear is not possible 
to accomplish. 

Chairman Hamilton. OK 

Mr. Oilman. 

allied sales to IRAN 

Mr. Oilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just have one area I would like to explore with the Secretary. 
The comments conveyed from the G-7 Tokyo Economic Summit 
stressed that our Nation and its allies have worked to coordinate 
their policies with respect to Iran, specifically, to seek a change in 
Iranian behavior in a number of areas. 



45 

Could you tell us what has been the record of allied cooperation 
in that area since that summit meeting and what are the practical 
implications of the EC Policy of Constructive Dialogue with Iran, 
announced at that Summit in Edinburg? 

Ms. Davis. Quite frankly, we haven't made the progress that we 
might have wished. I think it is important to differentiate the var- 
ious kinds of transfers and trade that we are focusing here on. 
With respect to arms themselves 

Mr. Oilman. Hasn't that been the primary focus on Grermanys 
trade with Iran? 

Ms. Davis. It is not arms that we are worried about because here 
we have had success but rather trade in dual-use technologies and 
items where we do have differences of view as to whether there 
should be complete restraint with respect to that trade. 

Mr. Oilman. I have before me a newsletter entitled the "Iran 
Business Monitor," Volume Number 2, Number 6 of November 
1993, and in it states that Siemens of Germany is currently com- 
peting for contracts valued in the hundreds of millions of 
deutschemarks on a digital communication network handling 
500,000 lines. 

The majority of the parts are to be produced in Shiraz and the 
final decision is yet to be announced by the Telecommunications 
Company of Iran. Have we been monitoring that proposal to find 
out whether there is any COCOM concerns and could our own com- 
panies sell the type of equipment to Iran under our export control 
laws? 

Ms. Davis. The regime on COCOM wouldn't be targeting Iran. 
You recall that is the regime that targeted in the East-West con- 
text the Soviet Union 

Mr. Oilman. But by analogy, would those same restrictions apply 
here? 

Ms. Davis. They are not going to apply within the context of 
COCOM. Again, what we are seeking to do in a successor regime 
is to focus on these new strategic concerns, and Iran is clearly in 
that category and working to constrain the trade in these dan- 
gerous technologies to Iran in the specific case I have — I am not 
familiar with the specific case, but clearly, we do care or else we 
wouldn't be spending so much time and energy to seek these goals 
with respect to the successor regime. 

Mr. Oilman. Could Mr. Clements comment on this proposal? 

Are you aware of it? 

Mr. Clements. Congressman, I have no direct information about 
the transaction. Under U.S. regulatory requirements, such a trans- 
fer would require a license, and as you know, under the Iran Sanc- 
tions Act, the Department of Commerce would not be authorized to 
issue such a license. 

Mr, Oilman. So our companies would not be able to engage in 
this. If we are looking for allied help and cooperation, how do we 
monitor this kind of sale? It is significant. We are talking about 
hundreds of millions of deutschemarks. 

Ms. Davis. We have made very clear. Congressman, that this 
kind of trade between our allies and Iran is not something that we 
support. 

Mr. Oilman. What do we do about tightening up the trade? 



46 

Ms. Davis. Well, in some ways, one wished one could control all 
of this as others. But as I tried to lay out in my opening remarks, 
these issues go to the national policies and sovereignties of govern- 
ments, so we seek by what 

Mr. Oilman. I am referring to that communique out from the G- 
7 Tokyo Economic Summit that stressed that our Nation and allies 
would work to coordinate this. 

Ms. Davis. Well, we are working to coordinate but, obviously, we 
are not there yet. 

Mr. Oilman. So it is sort of a failure of that policy? 

Ms. Davis. Let's not say it is a failure. I think we are having 
some success in convincing other governments that Iran is a dan- 
ger and a security threat, and we need to be constrained in the 
kinds of trade that we do. 

Mr. Oilman. Has Germany shown any indication that they sup- 
port our objectives in stopping dual-use exports to Iran? 

Ms. Davis. They have in place an export control regime that has 
been revamped and redesigned after their experiences with respect 
to trade with Iraq, and I believe that they are controlling sensitive 
trade to that countrv. 

Mr. Oilman. Well, could you specifically make some inquiries 
about this Siemens proposal and let our record contain your re- 
sponse to the extent of your review? 

Ms. Davis. I shall. 

Mr. Oilman. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask that it be made part of the record. 

Chairman Hamilton. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 

I am personally unfamiliar with the details of the alleged Siemens Corp. trans- 
action with the Telecommunications Company of Iran. That said, responsible officers 
of the Department have made inquiries of our embassy in Bonn, and I will provide 
you that information upon receipt. We have requested our embassy to obtain a sta- 
tus report on the alleged transaction, along with technical specifications to address 
whether the telecommunications eouipment is sophisticatea enough that it would 
have been controlled if Iran were a COCOM-proscribed destination. 

Mr. Oilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I thank the witnesses. 

land mines moratorium 

Chairman Hamilton. Do we support the South Pacific nuclear 
free zone? 

Ms. Davis. We do. 

Chairman Hamilton. OK Just to conclude, we have had you 
here a long time, and we appreciate your testimony. 

I was reading the reports in the paper about land mines, and I 
understand that worldwide production of these weapons is now up 
to an annual rate of 10 million, and that they kill something like 
200 people a day. They have become an awesomely destructive 
weapon and they now terrorize civilians in many countries in the 
world. I think the Senate last month passed an amendment to 
place a moratorium on the export of land mines. 

There are many countries, I understand, that produce land 
mines. We produce them. I am not sure if we are a major producer. 
The administration supports that moratorium; does it? 



47 

Ms. Davis. We do, and we have been working in the United Na- 
tions General Assembly on a resolution which can brin^ the world 
community in support of that moratorium. Indeed, this is an exam- 
ple of where we are taking the lead. Senator Leahy has been very 
concerned, has been working with us toward these goals and I 
raised these in consultations I had in Russia and Moscow a couple 
of weeks ago. I believe that Russia, too, will be prepared to support 
us in this particular goal. 

It is as tragic as you suggested, Mr. Chairman, and it is a goal 
that all of us should seek to work together to accomplish. 

Chairman Hamilton. Thank you very much. 

We have a few questions we might submit for a written response. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

We appreciate your testimony. The committee stands adjourned. 

Ms. Davis. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 



I 



PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LYNN E. DAVIS, UNDER SECRETARY 
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATC 

MR. CHAIRMAN, THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR 
BEFORE YOUR COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS AN ISSUE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE 
TO THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION. NON-PROLIFERATION IS THE ARMS 
CONTROL PRIORITY OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD. THE PROLIFERATION 
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, BALLISTIC MISSILES AND ADVANCED 
CONVENTIONAL ARMS, AS WELL AS THE TECHNOLOGIES WHICH ARE 
NECESSARY FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT, REPRESENTS THE MOST CRITICAL 
SECURITY THREAT WE FACE. AS A RESULT, THE CLINTON 
ADMINISTRATION IS PLACING A VERY HIGH PRIORITY ON 
NON-PROLIFERATION . 

PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE UN GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDED "TO WEAVE 
NON-PROLIFERATION MORE DEEPLY INTO THE FABRIC OF ALL OF OUR 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE WORLD'S NATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS." 
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER LAST WEEK PLACED NON-PROLIFERATION AS ONE 
OF HIS TOP PRIORITIES. INDEED, NON-PROLIFERATION IS INTEGRAL 
TO SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING ALL HIS PRIORITIES. 

LET ME BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S 
NON-PROLIFERATION AGENDA, WHICH SPANS THE WHOLE RANGE OF 
PROLIFERATION DANGERS, AND WHICH WE ARE PURSUING WITH A GLOBAL 

(49) 



50 



DIPLOMATIC EFFORT. IN SETTING THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR OUR 
ACTIONS, WE HAVE SOUGHT TO ENSURE THAT OUR POLICIES RESPOND TO 
THE POLITICAL, SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS WHICH MOTIVATE 
THOSE SEEKING TO ACQUIRE OR TRADE IN DANGEROUS TECHNOLOGIES AND 
WEAPONS . 

NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES 

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER RETURNED RECENTLY FROM A TRIP TO FOUR 
OF THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION — 
RUSSIA, KAZAKHSTAN, UKRAINE, AND BELARUS. I ACCOMPANIED THE 
SECRETARY EXCEPT FOR THE STOP IN BELARUS. 

IN ALL FOUR CAPITALS, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER PLEDGED 
AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND A TRANSITION TO A 
MARKET ECONOMY. HE STRESSED THAT THESE COUNTRIES ARE NO LONGER 
ADVERSARIES OF THE UNITED STATES BUT PARTNERS IN ASSURING 
SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. HE FURTHER FOCUSED ON A 
CRITICAL OBJECTIVE OF HIS MISSION — AVERTING THE SINGLE 
GREATEST DANGER EVER TO THREATEN HUMANITY: THE NUCLEAR DANGER 
AND THE THREAT FROM THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION. 

THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA ARE CONSULTING VERY CLOSELY ON 
THE TWIN GOALS OF NEGOTIATING AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE A 



51 



COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND ACHIEVING TH£ INDEFINITE EXTENSION 
IN 1995 OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) . PRESIDENT 
YELTSIN EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S 
PROPOSAL TO STOP PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS PURPOSES. RUSSIA REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE GOAL 
OF ELIMINATING CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND WE DICUSSED STEPS DESIGNED 
TO GAIN CONFIDENCE IN RUSSIA'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL 
WEAPONS CONVENTION. 

IN MOSCOW WE WORKED TOGETHER TO ENSURE A SMOOTH ENTRY INTO 
FORCE OF THE BILATERAL MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) 
AGREEMENT SIGNED BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER 
CHERNOMYRDIN IN SEPTEMBER, AS WELL AS CHANGES TO RUSSIA'S 
TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION WITH INDIA. WE LOOK FORWARD TO 
FUTURE RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE MTCR. 

IN KAZAKHSTAN, PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV TOLD SECRETARY 
CHRISTOPHER THAT KAZAKHSTAN WILL ACCEDE TO THE NPT AS A 
NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. SINCE 
KAZAKHSTAN HAS ALREADY RATIFIED THE START I TREATY, THIS WILL 
COMPLETE KAZAKHSTAN'S FULFILLMENT OF ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE 
LISBON PROTOCOL. WE ALSO AGREED TO ESTABLISH A NUNN-LUGAR 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO KAZAKHSTAN TO FACILITATE THE ELIMINATION 
OF THE SS-18 MISSILES THERE; THE NECESSARY AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN 
PREPARED FOR HIGH-LEVEL SIGNATURE. 



52 



IN UKRAINE, THE SECRETARY ADDRESSED A BROAD RANGE OF 
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY QUESTIONS. WE ARE PROVIDING $155 MILLION 
IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE, AND ARE PREPARED TO EXPAND 
SUBSTANTIALLY OUR ASSISTANCE ONCE UKRAINE UNDERTAKES MARKET 
REFORMS. ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTIONS, PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK 
REAFFIRMED THE GOAL OF A NON-NUCLEAR UKRAINE AND HIS PERSONAL 
COMMITMENT TO RATIFY THE START TREATY AND ACCEDE TO THE NPT AS 
A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATE. HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE LISBON 
PROTOCOL COVERS ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE, INCLUDING THE 
SS-24S. 

AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED ESTABLISHING A SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY CENTER, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE 
EMPLOYMENT FOR WEAPONS SCIENTISTS; PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO 
UKRAINE TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS; AND 
PROVIDING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR A $175 MILLION NUNN-LUGAR 
PROGRAM TO ASSIST IN DISMANTLING NUCLEAR FORCES IN UKRAINE. 
NUNN-LUGAR ASSISTANCE FOR DISMANTLING NUCLEAR FORCES IN UKRAINE 
WILL PROCEED ONCE THE UMBRELLA AGREEMENT ENTERS INTO FORCE AND 
SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS ARE CONCLUDED; THE FLOW OF 
ASSISTANCE WILL THEN DEPEND ON THE SCOPE AND PACE OF 
DISMANTLING IN UKRAINE. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE WORK AHEAD WITH 
UKRAINE AS THERE REMAINS SOME OPPOSITION WITHIN THE UKRAINIAN 
GOVERNMENT TO BEING A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE. 



53 



IN BELARUS, THE SECRETARY PRAISED THE SHUSHKEVICH 
GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS ALREADY FULLY APPROVED THE LISBON 
AGREEMENTS, JOINED THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE AND 
HAS A NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM IN PLACE. 

MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY ON THE THREE 
THOUSAND FORMER SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS THAT NEED TO BE 
ELIMINATED FROM UKRAINE, KAZAKHSTAN, AND BELARUS. THE U.S. IS 
WORKING ACTIVELY TO FACILITATE AGREEMENTS TO TRANSFER ALL THESE 
NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO RUSSIA FOR DISMANTLING AND TO PROVIDE 
COMPENSATION FOR THE HIGHLY-ENRICHED URANIUM IN THEM. THROUGH 
THE NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM, WE WILL ASSIST IN THE ELIMINATION OF 
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN ALL FOUR STATES. SUCH ASSISTANCE 
IS ALREADY FLOWING TO RUSSIA AND BELARUS. WE WILL SEEK TO PUT 
THE NECESSARY AGREEMENTS IN PLACE WITH UKRAINE AND KAZAKHSTAN 
IN THE COMING WEEKS. TO PREVENT THESE NATIONS FROM BECOMING A 
SOURCE OF DANGEROUS ARMS AND TECHNOLOGIES, WE ARE WORKING WITH 
THEM TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEMS. 

IN BOTH ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND DISMANTLEMENT ASSISTANCE, 
THE U.S. IS NOT ALONE. OUR BILATERAL EFFORTS ARE PART OF A 
MULTILATERAL PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE INVOLVING ALL THE G-7 
PARTNERS. THE UK, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND JAPAN ALL HAVE PROGRAMS 
FOR DISMANTLEMENT ASSISTANCE, THE EC HAS A PROGRAM FOR REACTOR 
SAFETY, AND OUR G-7 PARTNERS HAVE PROMISED SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC 
ASSISTANCE. 



54 



OUR ACTIVITIES IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES DEMONSTRATE 
THE MANY DIVERSE ELEMENTS WHICH CONSTITUTE THE CLINTON 
ADMINISTRATION'S OVERALL NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. NOW LET ME 
DESCRIBE OUR OVERALL POLICIES. 

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 

THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS CLEARLY THE GRAVEST 
PROLIFERATION DANGER WE FACE. THIS ADMINISTRATION REMAINS 
COMMITTED TO THE GOAL TO STOP THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS WORLDWIDE. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IS THE 
FOUNDATION OF THIS EFFORT. OUR FOREMOST GOAL IS UNIVERSAL 
MEMBERSHIP. WE ARE ACTIVELY URGING ALL NPT PARTIES TO JOIN US 
TO EXTEND THE NPT INDEFINITELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY IN 1995. SO 
FAR THIS GOAL HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY THE G-7, NATO, AND THE 
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) . WE 
WELCOME JAPAN'S RECENT DECISION IN SUPPORT. THE SOUTH PACIFIC 
FORUM INCLUDED AN ENDORSEMENT OF INDEFINITE EXTENSION IN ITS 
MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE. SUPPORT FROM THE DEVELOPING WORLD, 
WHICH MAKES UP THE LARGEST PART OF THE TREATY'S MEMBERSHIP, IS 
ALSO BEGINNING TO EMERGE. 

WE ARE SEEKING TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC 
ENERGY AGENCY HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS 



55 



WELL AS THE RESOURCES TO IMPLEMENT ITS VITAL SAFEGUARDS 
RESPONSIBILITIES. THE EXPERIENCE WITH IRAQ WAS AN IMPORTANT 
LESSON. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO CONFRONT THE THREAT THAT 
CERTAIN STATES ARE WILLING TO DISREGARD THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
THE NPT. TO THAT END, WE ARE WORKING TO STRENGTHEN THE IAEA'S 
SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE USE OF SPECIAL INSPECTIONS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING IN ORDER TO IMPROVE ITS CAPABILITIES TO 
DETECT CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES. 

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN TWO CRITICAL 
INITIATIVES IN SUPPORT OF AN OVERALL NON-PROLIFERATION 
STRATEGY: A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY AND A 
CUT-OFF IN FISSILE MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURPOSES. 

PRESIDENT CLINTON IN JULY ANNOUNCED THE EXTENSION OF THE 
U.S. MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING — AND CALLED ON THE OTHER 
NUCLEAR POWERS TO DO LIKEWISE. HE DID THIS IN ORDER TO PUT US 
"IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE POSITION TO NEGOTIATE A 
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, AND TO DISCOURAGE OTHER NATIONS FROM 
DEVELOPING THEIR OWN NUCLEAR ARSENALS." THE PRESIDENT'S 
ANNOUNCEMENT IMMEDIATELY RECEIVED BROAD SUPPORT FROM AROUND THE 
WORLD, AND MOMENTUM TOWARDS A CTB TREATY HAS BEEN GROWING 
STEADILY. 

SINCE JULY, WE HAVE INITIATED BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH 
A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ON CTBT ISSUES. SECRETARY 



56 



CHI^ISTOPHER HAS DISCUSSED CTBT WITH SEVERAL OF HIS 
COUNTERPARTS. I HAVE MET WITH OFFICIALS OF EACH OF THE OTHER 
FOUR NUCLEAR POWERS. THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE REVEALED GENERAL 
AGREEMENT AMONG THE FIVE ON MANY IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. WE ARE 
CURRENTLY FOCUSING MUCH OF OUR ATTENTION ON VERIFICATION 
ISSUES. 

ON THE MULTILATERAL FRONT, LAST SUMMER THE CONFERENCE ON 
DISARMAMENT (CD) REACHED CONSENSUS ON BEGINNING FORMAL 
NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA IN JANUARY 1994. SINCE THEN, WE HAVE MADE 
GOOD PROGRESS ON DRAFTING A SPECIFIC CD NEGOTIATING MANDATE. IN 
ADDITION, IN NEW YORK, AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY — FOR THE FIRST 
TIME — WE WILL ACHIEVE A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION SUPPORTING TEST 
BAN NEGOTIATIONS. 

WE WILL BE WORKING HARD TO PURSUE OUR NON-PROLIFERATION 
OBJECTIVES AND MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM TOWARD A CTBT, DESPITE THE 
CHINESE TEST LAST MONTH. CHINA DECIDED TO PROCEED 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE MORATORIUM BEING OBSERVED BY THE OTHER FOUR 
POWERS. THE UNITED STATES, JOINED BY MANY OTHER COUNTRIES, URGED 
THE CHINESE NOT TO TEST; WE ARE TRYING TO DISSUADE BEIJING FROM 
CONDUCTING ANY FURTHER TESTS. IN A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT, 
CHINA NOW SAYS PUBLICLY IT IS COMMITTED TO WORK TOWARD A CTBT BY 
1996, AND WE INTEND TO PRESS AHEAD TO COMPLETE A CTBT AS SOON AS 
POSSIBLE. 



57 



IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS, THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED 
A CONVENTION PROHIBITING THE PRODUCTION OF HIGHLY-ENRICHED 
URANIUM OR PLUTONIUM FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE PURPOSES OR OUTSIDE 
OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. THIS CONVENTION WILL BE AN 
IMPORTANT ADDITION TO THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
REGIME. ADHERENCE BY THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO THIS 
CONVENTION AND TO THE CTB WOULD BE IMPORTANT STEPS IN MEETING 
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT. AS IMPORTANT TO OUR 
NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS WOULD BE A COMMITMENT BY NON-NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS STATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE NOT PARTY TO THE NPT, NOT TO 
TEST AND TO CAP THE AMOUNT OF FISSILE MATERIAL OUTSIDE OF 
INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. WE ARE CONSULTING WITH OUR ALLIES 
AND OTHERS ON THE MECHANISMS FOR SUCH A CONVENTION AND LOOK 
FORWARD TO STARTING NEGOTIATIONS SHORTLY. 

AS AN INTERIM STEP AND TO PROVIDE WORLD LEADERSHIP IN 
ASSURING EXCESS FISSILE MATERIAL FROM DISMANTLED WEAPONS WILL 
NOT BE RECYCLED INTO NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE UNITED STATES 
WILL MAKE STOCKS OF FISSILE MATERIAL EXCESS TO ITS DEFENSE 
REQUIREMENTS SUBJECT TO OUR VOLUNTARY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH 
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. BEFORE THIS MEASURE IS 
IMPLEMENTED, HOWEVER, WE WILL CAREFULLY STUDY WHAT APPROACHES 
SHOULD BE USED TO ENSURE THAT SAFEGUARDS DO NOT REVEAL 
CLASSIFIED NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED INFORMATION. THE U.S. WILL 



58 



ALSO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH ITS PARTNERS IN THE NUCLEAR 
SUPPLIERS GROUP AND THE NPT EXPORTERS COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THAT 
NUCLEAR RELATED EXPORTS ARE SUBJECT TO STRINGENT CONTROLS. 

MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
REGIME ARE VITAL. BUT THEY MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO DEAL WITH THE MOST DIFFICULT 
CASES . 

PRESIDENT CLINTON MADE CLEAR THAT NORTH KOREA CANNOT BE 
ALLOWED TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR BOMB. WE ARE THUS WORKING CLOSELY 
WITH THE IAEA, JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA, AND OTHER INTERESTED 
PARTIES TO BRING NORTH KOREA INTO COMPLIANCE WITH ALL OF ITS 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. THIS IS NOT AN EASY PROCESS, BUT WE 
REMAIN COMMITTED TO OUR GOAL OF HAVING NORTH KOREA COMPLY WITH 
ITS SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT, AND IMPLEMENT THE 
NORTH-SOUTH DENUCLEARIZATION DECLARATION. RECENT NORTH KOREAN 
BEHAVIOR HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTING, ESPECIALLY ITS REJECTION OF 
THE IAEA'S INSPECTION REQUESTS. THE U.S. HAS MADE CLEAR ITS 
READINESS TO ADDRESS LEGITIMATE NORTH KOREAN CONCERNS. BUT 
UNLESS THE DPRK TAKES THE NECESSARY STEPS TO PERSUADE THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY THAT IT IS NOT PURSUING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION, WE 
WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO TERMINATE THE BILATERAL U.S. -DPRK 
DIALOGUE AND PURSUE FURTHER STEPS IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL. 



59 



WITH IRAQ, WE ARE CONTINUING OUR COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
SPECIAL COMMISSION TO PREVENT A RECONSTITUTION OF IRAQ'S 
ABILITY TO CONSTRUCT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) . SOME 
PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE RECENTLY; FOR EXAMPLE, IRAQ DISCLOSED 
SOME DATA ON ITS PRODUCTION INFRASTRUCTURE. HOWEVER, IRAQ'S 
OBSTRUCTIONIST BEHAVIOR UNDERSCORES IT'S EXTREME RELUCTANCE TO 
COMPLY FULLY WITH THE UN SECURITY" COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. 
SPECIFICALLY, LONG-TERM MONITORING AND VERIFICATION MUST BE 
IMPLEMENTED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME BEFORE AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT 
OF COMPLIANCE CAN BE MADE. WE WILL NOT ACCEPT IRAQ'S POSITION 
THAT IT WILL ACCEDE TO LONG-TERM MONITORING ONLY AFTER THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES TO RECOMMEND LIFTING SANCTIONS. 

THE ADMINISTRATION IS ALSO VERY CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN'S 
BEHAVIOR. IRAN'S ACTIONS LEAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT TEHRAN IS 
INTENT UPON DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY; THEY ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH ANY RATIONAL CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM. 
FORTUNATELY, THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS STILL IN ITS 
INFANCY AND IS DEPENDENT UPON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. WE ARE 
WORKING VIGOROUSLY TO CAUTION SUPPLIERS AGAINST COMMERCE WITH 
IRAN IN SENSITIVE NUCLEAR OR DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES. TO THAT 
END, THE SECRETARY HAS BEEN PERSONALLY ENGAGED IN A DIPLOMATIC 
EFFORT WITH OUR ALLIES IN EUROPE AND ASIA TO DEVELOP AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS TO DENY IRAN THE ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGIES 
AND COMPONENTS OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. 



60 



CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 

WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS, THROUGH MULTILATERAL FORA LIKE THE 
AUSTRALIA GROUP, IN TIGHTENING EXPORT CONTROLS TO PREVENT THE 
SPREAD OF THE MATERIALS NECESSARY TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL AND 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. WE ARE WORKING HARD TO PROMOTE THE WIDEST 
POSSIBLE ADHERENCE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND BIOLOGICAL 
WEAPONS CONVENTIONS. THE U.S. IS NOW ENGAGED IN PREPARATORY 
WORK AT THE HAGUE TO FACILITATE AN EARLY ENTRY INTO FORCE OF 
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) IN JANUARY 1995. AS THE 
PRESIDENT SAID AT THE UN, WE CALL UPON ALL NATIONS, INCLUDING 
OUR OWN, TO RATIFY THE CWC QUICKLY. TO STRENGTHEN THE 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC), WE ARE PARTING COMPANY 
WITH THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION AND PROMOTING NEW MEASURES 
DESIGNED TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY OF ACTIVITIES AND FACILITIES 
THAT COULD HAVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS APPLICATIONS, THEREBY 
INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION. 



MISSILE PROLIFERATION 

THE USE OF SCUD MISSILES BY IRAQ DURING THE GULF WAR 

IMPRESSED ON THE WORLD THE DANGERS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE 

PROLIFERATION. IMAGINE THE CONSEQUENCES IF THE SCUDS HAD 



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CARRIED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THE MULTILATERAL MISSILE 
TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE 
PRIMARY TOOL OF UNITED STATES MISSILE NON-PROLIFERATION 
POLICY. IT WORKS AND HAS ENJOYED SEVERAL SUCCESSES SINCE ITS 
CREATION IN 1987. WE NOW WANT TO MOVE THE REGIME INTO THE 
FUTURE, BEYOND A GROUP OF RESPONSIBLE SUPPLIERS THAT SEEKS TO 
ENSURE THAT ITS OWN INDUSTRIES DO NOT INADVERTENTLY CONTRIBUTE 
TO MISSILE PROLIFERATION, TO A GROUP THAT WORKS ACTIVELY 
TOGETHER TO DEAL WITH THE MISSILE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM 
WORLDWIDE. IN OTHER WORDS, WE WANT TO PROMOTE THE MTCR 
GUIDELINES AS A GLOBAL MISSILE NON-PROLIFERATION NORM, ENGAGING 
OUR PARTNERS IN A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE 
BEHAVIOR BY NON-MEMBER STATES, WHETHER SUPPLIERS OR RECIPIENTS 
OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. 

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO APPLY 
BOTH CARROTS AND STICKS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MISSILE 
PROLIFERATION. BESIDE OUR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION WITH RUSSIA, 
WE HAVE GAINED SOUTH AFRICA'S AGREEMENT TO ABANDON A SPACE 
LAUNCH VEHICLE PROGRAM. WE ARE PURSUING A POLICY OF PREVENTIVE 
DIPLOMACY IN SOUTH ASIA THAT SEEKS TO PERSUADE INDIA AND 
PAKISTAN TO FORGO A BALLISTIC MISSILE ARMS RACE THAT — 
COMBINED WITH THE REGION'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES — 
WOULD ONLY DESTABILIZE AN ALREADY FRAGILE SECURITY SITUATION 
THERE. AND OUR DECISION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA AND 



62 



PAKISTAN. FOR THE TRANSFER OF M-11 RELATED TECHNOLOGY 
DEMONSTRATES THAT WE'RE PREPARED TO PURSUE OUR 

NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS VIGOROUSLY EVEN WHEN SUCH EFFORTS MAY 
RISK FRICTIONS IN CRITICAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS. 

STRATEGIC TRADE 

WE HAVE INITIATED A THOROUGH REVIEW, ALONG WITH OUR COCOM 
PARTNERS, ON HOW TO REORIENT EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR WORLD. THIS INITIATIVE FLOWS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S 
DISCUSSIONS IN VANCOUVER AND TOKYO ON OUR PARTNERSHIP WITH 
RUSSIA IN COMBATTING PROLIFERATION. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT 
THAT COCOM CONTROLS ON TRADE WITH RUSSIA AND OTHER STATES OF 
THE FORMER WARSAW PACT SHOULD BE PHASED OUT AND A PARTNERSHIP 
OFFERED TO RUSSIA AND OTHER NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES IN A NEW 
REGIME. THE PARTNERSHIP WILL BE BASED ON CLEARLY DEFINED 
CRITERIA CONCERNING ADHERENCE TO EXPORT CONTROLS AND 
NON-PROLIFERATION NORMS. WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE DISCUSSING NOW 
HOW BEST TO STRUCTURE A NEW REGIME IN PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA 
AND THE OTHER NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY 
AND COORDINATION OF CONTROLS ON EXPORTS OF ARMS AND SENSITIVE 
DUAL-USE AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES. THIS PROPOSAL INCLUDES: 

— A MULTILATERAL APPROACH, FOR WE CANNOT BE FULLY SUCCESSFUL 
WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM OTHER SUPPLIERS OF SENSITIVE GOODS, 



63 



NOR CAN WE BE FAIR TO AMERICAN EXPORTERS IF OTHERS SEEK TO 
UNDERCUT OUR RESTRAINT. NEVERTHELESS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO 
ACT UNILATERALLY WHERE NECESSARY. OUR APPROACH SEEKS TO 
INCLUDE RUSSIA, OTHER NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES, AND CHINA, 
IN A REGIME COVERING ALL WHO CARRY OUT SUCH TRADE. 

— A FOCUS ON NEW DANGERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND 
ELSEWHERE WHERE THE DANGERS ARE GREATEST, PARTICULARLY IN 
IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, AND NORTH KOREA. 

— A LIBERALIZED ENVIRONMENT IN SECTORS WHERE APPROPRIATE — 
SUCH AS COMPUTERS. WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS ALREADY IN THIS 
RESPECT, SUCH AS THE SEPTEMBER 2 9 ANNOUNCEMENT THAT 
PROPOSED RAISING COMPUTER AND SUPERCOMPUTER LIMITS FOR MOST 
DESTINATIONS. 

— IMPROVEMENTS IN THE EXPORT REGIMES OF THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT 
STATES, THROUGH TRAINING AND OTHER ACTIVITIES. 

— COMMITMENTS TO AGREED PROCEDURES AND POLICIES FOR BOTH 
DUAL-USE ITEMS AND ARMS EXPORTS. 

THE RESPONSE FROM OUR ALLIES TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL HAS BEEN 
GENERALLY FAVORABLE, BUT THERE IS MUCH WORK AND NEGOTIATION TO 
BE DONE BEFORE THE PROCESS IS COMPLETE AND A SUCCESSOR TO COCOM 



64 



AGREED UPON. THIS PROCESS WILL MOVE FORWARD IN THE WEEKS AHEAD 
AND INTO THE FIRST PART OF 1994. WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP 
CONGRESS INFORMED AS TO THE STATUS OF THIS EFFORT. 

NON-PROLIFERATION: A NEW WAY OF THINKING 

IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, ACHIEVING 
OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES REQUIRES A NEW WAY OF THINKING 
ABOUT SECURITY AND THE TOOLS FOR ACCOMPLISHING OUR GOALS. WE 
APPRECIATE THE COMPLEX NATURE OF THE TASK FOR PROMOTING 
NON-PROLIFERATION: IT IS NOT SIMPLY STOPPING THE FLOW OF 
TECHNOLOGIES, WEAPONS OR HARDWARE. RATHER, IT DEALS WITH THE 
TOUGH AND INTER-RELATED ISSUES OF SECURITY, ECONOMICS, JOBS AND 
TRADE. IT ALSO CUTS TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PREROGATIVE OF STATES: 
THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. 

NON-PROLIFERATION REQUIRES GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT. WE INHERIT 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND AGREEMENTS, AND WE WILL CONTINUE 
TO RELY UPON THEM. HOWEVER, SUCCESS WILL REQUIRE NOT ONLY A 
GLOBAL APPROACH, BUT ALSO REGIONAL STRATEGIES TAILORED TO THE 
SPECIFIC SECURITY CONCERNS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. FOR 
EXAMPLE, TO FACILITATE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM 
UKRAINE, KAZAKHSTAN AND BELARUS WE ARE PREPARED TO OFFER THEM 
SECURITY ASSURANCES ONCE THEY BECOME NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE 
PARTIES TO THE NPT . SIMILARLY, THE RECENT HISTORIC 



65 



BREAKTHROUGHS IN THE PEACE PROCESS HAVE CREATED NEW 
POSSIBILITIES FOR ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE 
USING THE ARMS CONTROLS AND REGIONAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP TO 
PROMOTE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THAT WILL LAY THE GROUND 
WORK FOR MORE AMBITIOUS STEPS, ONCE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT 
HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. 

DIPLOMACY, BACKED UP BY AMERICAN POWER, INFLUENCE, PRESTIGE 
AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES, REPRESENTS OUR PRIMARY TOOL IN 
ATTAINING OUR NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE 
WILL ENSURE THAT U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES ARE PREPARED TO COPE 
WITH POSSIBLE THREATS IF OUR NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS FAIL. 

SUCCESS WILL REQUIRE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP. THE U.S. STANDS 
UNIQUELY POISED IN ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO 
PROMOTE NON-PROLIFERATION. WE SEEK TO MAKE COOPERATION ON 
NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR SECURITY 
ALLIANCES AS THEY TRANSFORM TO MEET THE NEW WORLD'S 
CHALLENGES. NON-PROLIFERATION IS CENTRAL TO BUILDING OUR NEW 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE NIS. WE HAVE LINKED OUR 
COOPERATION IN SPACE TO ADHERENCE TO THE MTCR BY RUSSIA, CHINA 
AND INDIA. NON-PROLIFERATION IS IN THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF 
NATIONS ALL AROUND THE WORLD, 



66 



IN SUPPORT OF NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS, WE ARE PREPARED TO 
PROVIDE MODEST ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES. IN PARTICULAR, 
ASSISTANCE IN EXPORT CONTROL AND ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION 
TECHNIQUES CAN GREATLY REDUCE THREATS TO U.S. SECURITY 
INTERESTS THROUGH SMUGGLING OR THROUGH REGIONAL 

MISCALCULATIONS. THESE ASSISTANCE EFFORTS ARE A SMALL PRICE 
TO PAY TO PREVENT THE LARGER DANGERS, AND FAR LESS EXPENSIVE 
THAN EXPANDING MILITARY FORCES OR DEFENSIVE MILITARY SYSTEMS. 
WHILE AMERICA MUST LEAD, WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT WE CANNOT 
SHOULDER ALL NON-PROLIFERATION RESPONSIBILITIES ALONE. WE WILL 
REQUIRE THE HELP OF OTHERS TO SUCCEED, FIRST IN CONTROLLING 
TRADE IN DANGEROUS ARMS AND TECHNOLOGIES WHICH IS AVAILABLE 
AROUND THE WORLD. OUR EXISTING ALLIANCES ARE ALSO IMPORTANT TO 
CREATING THE REGIONAL STABILITY NECESSARY TO REDUCE MOTIVATIONS 
FOR PROLIFERATION. WE WILL ALSO NEED TO FORGE NEW COALITIONS 
IN MEETING THESE CHALLENGES. 

IN PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT CASES WE MAY FACE RELUCTANCE BOTH 
AT HOME AND ABROAD TO FACE UP TO THE THREAT POSED BY 
PROLIFERANT COUNTRIES. WE ACCEPT THIS CHALLENGE, GIVEN THE 
POTENTIAL THREATS TO AMERICAN SECURITY. 

FINALLY MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME CLOSE ON THE NEED FOR OUR 
WORKING TOGETHER. WE NEED THE HELP OF CONGRESS, SO THAT WHEN 






67 



THE ADMINISTRATION SEEKS THESE BROAD NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS, 
WE WILL HAVE YOUR SUPPORT. I BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT ONE OF THE 
REASONS THAT U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS HAVE ENJOYED STRONG 
BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IS BECAUSE OF A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES. LET ME ASK FOR 
YOUR HELP, SO THAT THOSE WHO UNDERTAKE DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES 
WILL KNOW THAT THE U.S. AS A WHOLE WILL RESPOND. I LOOK 
FORWARD TO WORKING TOGETHER, FOR NON-PROLIFERATION, WHICH I 
KNOW ENJOYS SUPPORT ON BOTH SIDES OF THE AISLE. 

THANK YOU. 



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PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN A. WULF ACTING ASSISTANT 
FOR NONPROLIFERATION AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL US 
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ' ' ' 

INTRODUCTION 

LAST MONTH, WHEN PRESIDENT CLINTON ANNOUNCED THE NOMINATION 
OF JOHN HOLUM TO BE THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND 
DISARMAMENT AGENCY (ACDA) , HE STATED THAT, "MY ADMINISTRATION 
HAS PLACED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE ON ARMS CONTROL AND COMBATTING 
THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. ... WE MUST 
PURSUE A BOLD STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE GROWING DANGERS OF 
PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING NEGOTIATING A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON 
TESTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THE WRONG HANDS, WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION AND MISSILES THAT DELIVER THEM THREATEN THE SECURITY 
OF US ALL." HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, "A REVITALIZED ARMS CONTROL 
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ACHIEVING 
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND FIGHTING WEAPONS PROLIFERATION." 

IN THE WAKE OF THE END OF THE COLD WAR, THE PROLIFERATION 
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR MISSILE DELIVERY 
SYSTEMS IS RECEIVING THE PRIORITY ATTENTION THAT WAS ONCE 
RESERVED FOR THE SUPERPOWERS' NUCLEAR COMPETITION. WE ARE FACED 
DAILY WITH NEW PROBLEMS -- FOR EXAMPLE THOSE RAISED BY NORTH 
KOREA IN MEETING ITS NPT OBLIGATIONS AND BY INTERNATIONAL 
EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ DOES NOT AGAIN PURSUE A NUCLEAR 
WEAPON PROGRAM. THE GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION ENVIRONMENT HAS 
CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY, IN BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE WAYS AS 
REFLECTED BY THE HIGH PRIORITY PLACED ON NONPROLIFERATION BY 
PRESIDENT CLINTON IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS. 



69 



ACDA HAS PLAYED AND WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE 
IN SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT'S ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION 
AGENDA. ACDA HAS LONG HAD A BUREAU DEVOTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY 
TO NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES. IN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE 
THAT MUST BE ATTACHED TO REGIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF 
PROLIFERATION, AN IMPORTANCE HEIGHTENED BY THE END OF THE COLD 
WAR, ACDA HAS RECENTLY DECIDED TO ORGANIZE ALMOST ALL OF ITS 
NONPROLIFERATION AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES INTO A 
SINGLE BUREAU. WE WILL WORK VIGOROUSLY TO SUPPORT FULL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS THAT PROMOTE OUR 
NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES — FOR EXAMPLE EXISTING AGREEMENTS 
SUCH AS THE NPT AND THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO — AND NEW 
AGREEMENTS PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT SUCH AS A COMPREHENSIVE 
TEST BAN AND AN INTERNATIONALLY AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIED 
AGREEMENT BANNING THE PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES -- A 
SO-CALLED CUT-OFF AGREEMENT. 

THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTS A STRONG SYSTEM OF EXPORT 
CONTROLS DESIGNED TO STEM THE FLOW OF MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT AND 
TECHNOLOGY THAT COULD SUPPORT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) 
OR MISSILE PROGRAMS. WE HAVE DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO 
STRENGTHENING THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP, THE ZANGGER 
COMMITTEE, THE MTCR, AND THE AUSTRALIA GROUP. WE WILL CONTINUE 
TO DO SO. 



70 



THIS ADMINISTRATION ALSO WILL SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ENSURE 
THAT REGIONAL NONPROLIFERATION APPROACHES RECEIVE ADEQUATE 
ATTENTION AND THAT THE FULL BENEFITS OF THE EXPERIENCE THAT THE 
U.S. HAS OBTAINED IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL AND VERIFICATION 
IS MADE AVAILABLE TO STATES THAT WOULD BENEFIT FROM IT. IN 
SOUTH ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA, WE ARE 
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS THAT COULD CAP, ROLL BACK, AND 
FINALLY ELIMINATE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR MISSILE 
DELIVERY SYSTEMS. I BELIEVE THAT THE EXPERIENCE THAT WE HAVE 
WITHIN ACDA WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN PURSUING 
THESE OBJECTIVES. 

I WOULD LIKE TO TURN NOW TO ONE IMPORTANT NONPROLIFERATION 
TOPIC WHERE ACDA HAS PLAYED THE LEAD ROLE WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH -- NAMELY THE EXTENSION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
TREATY (NPT) . THE NPT IS THE CORNERSTONE OF THE NUCLEAR 
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME. IN 1995, THE PARTIES TO THAT TREATY 
WILL HOLD A CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK TO DECIDE WHETHER THE NPT 
SHOULD CONTINUE IN FORCE INDEFINITELY, OR BE EXTENDED FOR AK 
ADDITIONAL FIXED PERIOD OR PERIODS. BY THE TERMS OF THE TREATY, 
THIS DECISION MAY BE TAKEN BY A MAJORITY OF ITS PARTIES. 

THE 1995 NPT CONFERENCE IS A UNIQUE AND UNPRECEDENTED 
EVENT. NO OTHER MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL TREATY CONTAINS A 
PROVISION TO LEAVE ITS FURTHER DURATION TO A DECISION SOME TIME 
IN THE FUTURE. NEW RULES MUST BE FORGED TO GOVERN THE 
CONFERENCE AND THE DECISION-MAKING ON EXTENSION. 



71 



THE 1995 CONFERENCE ALSO WILL REVIEW THE NPT, AS THE 
PARTIES HAVE DONE EVERY FIVE YEARS SINCE THE TREATY FIRST 
ENTERED INTO FORCE IN 1970. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST SUCH REVIEW, 
HOWEVER, SINCE IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF ITS NPT COMMITMENTS WERE 
REVEALED AND THE FIRST CONFERENCE TO TAKE PLACE IN THE WAKE OF 
THE EFFORT BY NORTH KOREA TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY. THE 
CONFERENCE ALSO MAY SEEK TO ADDRESS THE UNPRECEDENTED 
PROLIFERATION IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER 
SOVIET UNION. 

U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE 1995 NPT CONFEREUCE 

THE PRESIDENT RECENTLY HAS AFFIRMED THAT THE UNITED STATES 
WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SECURE THE INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE 
NPT IN 1995. THIS IS THE OUTCOME THE U.S. SOUGHT IN THE 
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NPT IN 19 68, AND THAT POSITION HAS NEVER 
CHANGED. THE PRESIDENT ALSO HAS AFFIRMED THAT THE UNITED STATES 
WILL SEEK TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
(IAEA) HAS THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT ITS SAFEGUARDS 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND WILL WORK TO STRENGTHEN THE IAEA'S ABILITY 
TO DETECT CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. THESE EFFORTS, IN 
TURN, WILL STRENGTHEN IMPLEMENTATION OF, AND SHOULD CONTRIBUTE 
TO ENHANCED COMPLIANCE WITH, THE NPT WHICH RELIES ON THE IAEA'S 
SAFEGUARDS TO VERIFY THE PARTIES' COMPLIANCE WITH ITS 
UNDERTAKINGS. 

THE INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NPT IS, WE BELIEVE, THE 
BEST WAY TO ENSURE THAT THE BENEFITS THE NPT PROVIDES — 



72 



ENHANCING REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY, 
SUPPORTING ONGOING EFFORTS IN THE ARMS CONTROL ARENA, AND 
PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL 
PURPOSES -- WILL REMAIN AVAILABLE. INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE 
NPT ALSO WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A SECURITY ENVIRONMENT THAT WILL 
DEPRIVE OTHER STATES OF THE ARGUMENT THAT THEY NEED TO DEVELOP 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO COPE WITH AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. FINALLY, 
INDEFINITE EXTENSION MEANS THAT NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION IS AN 
ENDURING VALUE, NOT SUBJECT TO SOME FINITE LIMIT. 

THE EXTENSION DECISION — PROSPECTS 

THE PROSPECTS FOR EXTENDING THE NPT ARE EXCELLENT. THERE 
IS VIRTUAL UNANIMITY AMONG THE PARTIES THAT THE TREATY SHOULD BE 
EXTENDED. WHAT IS AT ISSUE, HOWEVER, IS THE LENGTH OF THE 
EXTENSION PERIOD THAT THE PARTIES WILL SUPPORT. THE NPT 
PROVIDES FOR THREE CHOICES-- INDEFINITE EXTENSION; EXTENSION FOR 
AN ADDITIONAL FIXED PERIOD; OR EXTENSION FOR ADDITIONAL FIXED 
PERIODS. OF THESE THREE CHOICES, INDEFINITE EXTENSION IS 
CLEARLY THE BEST, AND THIS IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE U.S. IT IS 
THE ONLY ONE OF THE CHOICES THAT CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY 
PROVIDES FOR AN ENDURING NONPROLIFERATION TREATY THAT CAN SERVE 
AS THE FOUNDATION OF AN EFFECTIVE GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME. 

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR INDEFINITE EXTENSION IS GROWING. 
IN ADDITION TO STATEMENTS BY THE G-7 COUNTRIES, THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY, AND NATO, THE 5 8 MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE ON 
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) IN 1992, AND THE SOUTH 



73 



PACIFIC FORUM IN AUGUST 1993 HAVE ENDORSED INDEFINITE NPT 
EXTENSION IN MINISTERIAL LEVEL COMMUNIQUES. SUPPORT AMONG THE 
NONALIGNED COUNTRIES, WHICH MAKE UP THE BULK OF THE TREATY'S 
MEMBERSHIP IS EMERGING SLOWLY, BUT IT IS EMERGING. A NUMBER OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY DO NOT RULE OUT 
INDEFINITE EXTENSION, BUT ARE WATCHING CLOSELY THE ACTIONS OF 
THE U.S. AND OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IN OTHER AREAS BEFORE 
COMMITTING THEMSELVES. THE CONTINUATION OF THE NUCLEAR TESTING 
MORATORIUM AND SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR 
TEST BAN TREATY BY 19 9 5 ARE MOST IMPORTANT TO THE VAST MAJORITY 
OF THESE STATES. 

NONPROLIFERATION ACHIEVEMENTS 

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
NONPROLIFERATION AREA THAT WILL STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE WHO 
SUPPORT INDEFINITE EXTENSION. 

FIRST, THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE NPT CONTINUES TO GROW AS MORE 
AND MORE STATES RECOGNIZE THE BENEFITS OF BEING IN, RATHER THAN 
OUTSIDE OF, THE REGIME. SOUTH AFRICA'S DECISION TO ROLL BACK 
ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM AND JOIN THE NPT IS ONE OF THE MORE 
DRAMATIC EXAMPLES. WITH THE ACCESSIONS OF GUYANA AND MAURITANIA 
THIS MONTH, THERE ARE NOW 161 STATES PARTY TO THE NPT, AND 
SUPPORT FOR THE NORM OF NONPROLIFERATION ALSO CONTINUES TO GROW. 

ONCE CONSIDERED TO BE PROLIFERATION THREATS THEMSELVES, 
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL HAVE TAKEN DRAMATIC STEPS TO REDUCE MUTUAL 



74 



SUSPICION ABOUT THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND ARE MOVING TOWARD 
FULL ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO (THE LATIN AMERICAN 
NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE TREATY) AND THE APPLICATION OF 
FULL-SCOPE IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO ALL OF THEIR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. 
WE REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT THEY WILL SERIOUSLY CONSIDER ACCEDING TO 
THE NPT ONCE THEY HAVE COMPLETED ACTION ON TLATELOLCO. 

REVELATIONS ABOUT IRAQ'S CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
PROGRAM GALVANIZED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY INTO ACTION TO 
STRENGTHEN THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. INTEREST IN SPECIAL 
INSPECTIONS, UNTIL RECENTLY AN UNEXPLOITED PROVISION IN STANDARD 
NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS, WAS REVIVED AS STATES SEARCHED FOR 
WAYS TO HEAD OFF FUTURE VIOLATIONS. THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIER 
COUNTRIES, AT U.S. INITIATIVE, TOOK STEPS TO TIGHTEN CONTROLS ON 
THE EXPORT OF NUCLEAR DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY WHEN IT 
BECAME APPARENT THAT IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM OWED A GREAT DEAL TO 
LEGALLY AND ILLEGALLY PROCURED DUAL-USE COMMODITIES. 

FINALLY, BUT TO MANY NPT PARTIES, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THERE 
IS THE END OF THE COLD WAR, AND WITH ITS DEMISE A DRAMATIC SURGE 
OF ACTIVITY IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL BETWEEN THE U.S. AND 
RUSSIA. IN ADDITION TO THE INF AGREEMENT AND START I AND II, 
THE U.S. HAS DECIDED TO NEGOTIATE A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST 
BAN TREATY (CTBT), VIEWED BY MANY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AS 
THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL MEASURE THAT 
COULD BE PURSUED BY THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO MEET THEIR ARMS 
CONTROL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT. 



75 



LAST JULY, AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW, PRESIDENT CLINTON 
DECIDED TO EXTEND THE U.S. MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING AT 
LEAST THROUGH SEPTEMBER OF 1994, AND HE URGED THE OTHER NUCLEAR 
POWERS TO DO THE SAME. HE DECIDED THAT THE BENEFITS OF FURTHER 
TESTS WOULD BE OUTWEIGHED BY THE COSTS, SPECIFICALLY 
UNDERCUTTING OUR OWN NONPROLIFERATION GOALS. ALTHOUGH WE THINK 
THAT NPT EXTENSION SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO ANY OTHER 
CONSIDERATION, WE RECOGNIZE THAT MANY OTHER NPT PARTIES BELIEVE 
THAT NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR TEST BAN SHOULD BE A REQUIREMENT FOR 
A LONG-TERM EXTENSION OF THE TREATY. 

IN SPITE OF BEST INTENTIONS AND EFFORTS, NEGOTIATION OF A 
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY MAY PROVE TIME-CONSUMING AND MAY NOT BE 
CONCLUDED BY EARLY 1995. HENCE, WE BELIEVE A GLOBAL MORATORIUM 
ON TESTING IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR OBTAINING MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR 
LONG-TERM EXTENSION OF THE NPT. ACCORDINGLY THE UNITED STATES 
IS URGING ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO REFRAIN FROM NUCLEAR 
TESTING. THIS WOULD PUT US IN THE BEST POSITION TO MAINTAIN THE 
NPT AND STRENGTHEN THE GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME. 

THE ADMINISTRATION'S RECENT PROPOSAL TO NEGOTIATE AN 
INTERNATIONALLY AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE MULTILATERAL 
CONVENTION BANNING THE PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IS ANOTHER 
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT WHICH RESPONDS TO A LONG-HELD DESIRE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT. 



76 



CHALLENGES TO INDEFINITE EXTENSION 

OF COURSE, THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT COULD 
COMPLICATE ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEFINITE, OR EVEN LONG-TERM 
EXTENSION OF THE NPT . THESE INCLUDE THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME 
PARTIES TO COMMIT TO INDEFINITE EXTENSION ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
THIS WOULD REMOVE ALL PRESSURE ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES FOR 
GREATER PROGRESS TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND AN INTEREST ON 
THE PART OF SOME COUNTRIES TO SEEK A LIMITED EXTENSION 
(10-20 YEARS) AND TO CONDITION FUTURE EXTENSIONS ON CONCLUSION 
OF A CTBT OR OTHER ARMS CONTROL MEASURE. 

OTHER PARTIES MAY SEEK LEGALLY-BINDING SECURITY ASSURANCES, 
BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, FROM THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AND 
THERE WILL BE EFFORTS BY SOME STATES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS TO PROMOTE SUPPORT FOR A NONDISCRIMINATORY 
REPLACEMENT TO THE NPT, I.E., WHEREIN ALL STATES ARE NON-NUCLEAR 
WEAPON STATES. 

THE QUALITY OF ADHERENCE TO THE NPT IS ALSO CRITICAL. 
WHILE UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE IS DESIRABLE, STRICT COMPLIANCE BY 
PARTIES TO THE TERMS OF THE TREATY IS ESSENTIAL. THERE MAY BE 
CONTINUING CONCERNS ABOUT TREATY VIOLATIONS BY NPT PARTIES SUCH 
AS IRAQ WHICH COULD CAUSE SOME PARTIES TO QUESTION THE NPT'S 
UTILITY OR GENERATE INTEREST IN AMENDMENTS TO STRENGTHEN ITS 
VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. THE DPRK'S THREATENED WITHDRAWAL FROM 
THE TREATY HAS ALSO BEEN A SOURCE OF GRAVE CONCERN BOTH TO THE 
U.S. AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE SEEK A NONNUCLEAR 



77 



PENINSULA AND TO THAT END WE URGE THE DPRK TO FULFILL ALL OF ITS 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING THE NPT AND THE DPRK ' S 
FULL-SCOPE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. WE ALSO URGE THE DPRK TO 
COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATION OF AND BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT AN EFFECTIVE 
BILATERAL INSPECTION REGIME UNDER THE NORTH/SOUTH NONNUCLEAR 
DECLARATION. 

FINALLY, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT STATES NOT MEMBERS OF THE 
NPT. IT IS IMPORTANT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT UKRAINE AND KAZAKHSTAN 
FOLLOW THROUGH ON THEIR COMMITMENTS TO JOIN THE NPT AS 
NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AND IMPLEMENT THE REQUIRED FULL-SCOPE 
IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS. 

THE ROAD TO 1995 

THE ROAD TO 1995 WILL INCLUDE NONPROLIFERATION SUCCESSES 
AND CHALLENGES. IT WILL NOT BE A SMOOTH ROAD. THOROUGH 
PREPARATIONS WITHIN THE U.S. ARE ESSENTIAL, AND ACDA, AS THE 
LEAD AGENCY FOR THE 199 5 NPT CONFERENCE, IS CARRYING OUT THESE 
PREPARATIONS VIGOROUSLY AND WITH THE COORDINATED SUPPORT OF 
OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES. 

A KEY ELEMENT OF THE U.S. PREPARATIONS IS EXTENSIVE, 
WIDE-RANGING AND HIGH-LEVEL DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH OTHER NPT 
PARTIES AROUND THE WORLD. THE CONSULTATIONS THAT WE HAVE HAD TO 
DATE HAVE, IN ALMOST ALL CASES, BEEN USEFUL DIALOGUES ABOUT THE 
NPT AND THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME. WE HAVE FOUND MOST PARTIES 
TO BE EAGER TO ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION OF THE OPTIONS FOR 
EXTENSION AND WILLING TO CONSIDER THE ARGUMENTS FOR AN 
INDEFINITE EXTENSION. THESE CONSULTATIONS WILL CONTINUE AND BE 
EXPANDED BETWEEN NOW AND 1995 TO INCLUDE AS MANY NPT PARTIES AS 
POSSIBLE. 



78 



APPENDIX 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD AND RESPONSES THERETO 

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 



I. Another major nonproliferation objective outlined in President Clinton's 
September 27th speech at the United Nations was reform of COCOM and the U.S. export 
control system - to streamline and support U.S. exports while pursuing the battle against 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

What are your plans for reauthorization of the Export Administration Act? 

ANSWER: 

The Administration is drafting legislation with the goals of protecting our 
nonproliferation objectives and streamlining the existing export control system. 

By addressing a mix of foreign policy, national security, and economic security issues, 
we believe the new EAA should reflect the realities of the post-Cold War world. To this 
end, we are guided by the principles outlined in the Trade Promotion Coordinating 
Committee (TPCC) report as well as other Presidential directives. The goal is to strike an 
appropriate balance -- one that sufficiently deals with our nonproliferation concerns as well 
as our economic interests. 



When will we see an Administration draft bill on EAA? 

answt:r: 

The Administration intends to transmit its EAA legislation not later than the end of 
January. We want to give Congress a sufficient opportunity to review the draft bill, schedule 
hearings, and begin the forma! debate in earnest next spring. Our goal is to pass new 
legislation before the current EAA expires in June 1994. The Administration views this as 
a high priority, and the Department of State, Commerce and other concerned agencies are 
working very hard to draft a bill. 



How do you plan to streamline export controls so that you can both promote 
exports and tighten controls on dual-use exports? 



ANSVVXR: 



The President has repeatedly pledged to reform the export control process so that 
it will effectively promote legitimate exports, which support our foreign policy and national 
security goals, while further tightening controls on these dual-use items that pose serious 
proliferation concerns. To this end, the Administration is committed to several specific 
improvements: Guarantee that U.S. economic interests are given greater consideration in 



79 



export controls decisions; Eliminate unnecessary and ineffective export controls; Eliminate 
bureaucratic delay and duplication in the licensing review and referral process; and 
Consolidate the Department of State's export control functions within one bureau. Already, 
the U.S., along with our allies in COCOM (the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Strategic Export Controls), have reduced the number of controlled dual-use items to focus 
more effectively on the most sensitive technologies. 



The U.S. has a reputation for having a cumbersome, complicated licensing 
process that takes U.S. exporters much longer to secure licenses than 
exporters in other industrialized countries. Is any consideration being given 
to a proposal which has been around for several years of a One-Stop-Shop for 
export control licensing - a single office to which an exporter could apply for 
a license or for licensing information? 



ANSWER: 



A thorough review of the export control system is now underway in the context of the 
Export Administration Act, which expires next year. We anticipate that this review will 
address major suggestions for improving the system. 

In the interim, the State Department has taken concrete steps to ensure timely, 
thorough analysis of all export licensing requests. Specifically, the consolidation of State 
Department review of Commerce Department dual-use licenses as well as munitions 
licensing responsibilities and personnel into the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs is already 
facilitating this effort. We are seeking to further reduce processing times to respond to a 
major industry concern. At present, most State Department munitions licenses are 
processed within ten working days. 



2. President Clinton's nonproliferation initiative also promises a comprehensive 
review of U.S. conventional arms transfer policy. 

Which agencies are responsible for this review? 

ANSWER: 

The National Security Council is coordinating the Presidential review of conventional 
arms transfer policy. The departments and agencies that will be involved in the drafting 
process are State. DoD, Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency. 



80 



How will this review differ from previous reviews -- by the Office of 
Technology Assessment, the General Accounting Office, the Congressional 
Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service? 



ANSWER: 



The current review will take a fresh look at all aspects of our conventional arms 
transfer policy. In so doing it will take into account previous reviews undertaken by other 
agencies and Congressional bodies. 

In the changed circumstances of the end of the Cold War, including substantially 
changed markets for defense exports as well as new regional realities, our conventional arms 
transfer policy should incorporate four principal goals: contributing to peace and security 
in regions of the world, protecting U.S. troops while supporting our allies, restraining 
proliferation of destabilizing weapons systems, and preserving our defense industrial base. 
The policy review will focus on two broad lines of inquiry: the utility of enhancing 
transparency and/or limiting supplies of conventional arms (either by region or type) and 
the appropriateness of adopting measures to promote U.S. conventional arms exports. 
Naturally, there will be some tension between these two lines of inquiry. 

On the restraints/transparency side, there will be interagency examination of past 
efforts at enhanced transparency, such as the P-5 process begun following the Gulf War and 
the UN Arms Register, with an eye to expanding or revitalizing these efforts where practical. 
The review will also examine the feasibility of new regimes aimed at limiting transfers by 
type or region in a way that it consistent with the Administration's broader foreign policy 
goals. 

On export promotion, the review will examine the changing domestic and 
international arms market, the relationship among exports, jobs and the defense industrial 
base, and the proper role for the government to play to ensure a level international playing 
field for U.S. defense firms. This will include the government's role in marketing, export 
financing, and internationalization of U.S. defense procurement. Finally ,the review will 
examine how efforts at cooperative defense conversion in the states of Central/Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union could help achieve our conventional arms transfer 
policy goals. 

How will this review relate to existing legislation on arms exports, the Arms 
Export Control Act, to arms registry efforts at the UN, to the Permanent Five 
Talks on Arms Transfers, and to past Congressional efforts to legislate a 
multilateral conventional arms restraint regime? 

ansvvt:r: 



81 



We are reviewing the arms transfer policy in the context of all existing legislation 
including the Arms Export Control Act and the Administration's proposed revision of the 
Foreign Assistance Act. The review will also be guided by the Administration's commitment 
to pursue regional arms control and multilateral arms transfer regimes including the UN 
Register and the Permanent Five Talks. We will, of course, take into account the 
recommendations expressed by Congress on such regimes in Title IV of the Foreign 
Relations Act for FY 1992 and 1993. In so doing we will attempt to build on existing 
efforts. 



II. COCOM 



1. One of the most difficult aspects of your COCOM-successor proposal, it seems 
to me, will be getting international agreement on how to handle states such as Iran, Iraq, 
Libya and North Korea. 

What progress, if any, are you making in getting a unified policy on exports 
to these states? 

ANSWER: 

Our basic goal is to design a regime that will take the place of COCOM to deal with 
new threats to international and regional security. We have put forward a proposal for a 
new flexible regime that has among its goals that of ensuring greater responsibility and 
transparency with respect to arms sales and transfers of sensitive dual-use items, with a 
particular focus on areas such as the Middle East and South Asia. 

At the same time, our proposal has the further goal of ensuring that sensitive arms 
and other dangerous items do not fall into unsafe hands, and that the new regime can 
function effectively to deny access of such items to states whose behavior is a cause for 
serious concern. 

While discussions among our allies and with other prospective partners are 
continuing, we have made some progress, though all of the understandings and agreements 
reached to date will be subject to further review and approval by governments and reflected 
in guidelines and procedures that are still being negotiated. That said, on a preliminary 
basis, all of the seventeen industrialized democracies that participate in the COCOM 
arrangement have accepted our position that the new regime should work to prevent the 
acquisition of armaments and dual-use items for military end uses in regard to Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, and North Korea, though they prefer that this understanding not be accentuated in 
public. 

We also have general acceptance by our partners that prospective members in the 



82 



new regime will need to accept (in addition to other criteria being developed) a moratorium 
on military related shipments to these four. This is important as we seek to broaden 
participation in the new regime to include other suppliers, such as the Visegrads, Russia and 
other major states of the former USSR, and developing countries that have established 
credible nonproliferation credentials. The underlying policy would be that access to 
sensitive technology requires adherence to nonproliferation norms and responsible export 
controls. 

But there are differences. Europe's policy towards Iran involves a higher level of 
trade in dual-use items for civil end uses than our own stricter policies. We will continue 
to work to narrow the differences in this area -- and are pressing hard for procedures with 
teeth to ensure transparency and prior notification concerning any such sales to these four 
states as a function of the new regime. But it is unlikely in the near term that we will be 
able to develop fully harmonized policies on all proposed civil end uses of dual-use items. 
That is why we have put forward a proposal for a new regime that also provides a channel 
in which we can continue to pursue our concerns in areas where there is a divergence of 
views with partners - in particular, through ongoing discussion of the behavior of such states 
and prospects for diversion of sensitive items. 



III. CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES 



1. The United States has extensive military coproduction/codevelopment programs 
with NATO partners, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Israel and Egypt. Such programs 
spread the burden of the defense development programs, but also carry the risk of the 
proliferation of U.S. -origin technologies. 

How do you react to reports that Israel has engaged in the transfer of U.S.- 
origin missile technologies to the People's Republic of China? 

answt:r: 

Israel has engaged in sales of military equipment to China. We have raised with the 
Government of Israel concern over the possibility of Israeli sales of U.S.-origin technology 
or hardwre to China. 

When we receive reliable reports of possible diversions, we discuss them with Israel. 
We report to Congress whenever required under Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act. 
We have emphasized in our discussions with Israel the need to deal with diversion questions, 
because we do not want them to become an obstacle to the close collaboration on defense 
issues which has always characterized our relationship. 



83 



If so, what steps does the Clinton administration intend to take so as to 
preclude and deny such transfers in the future? 



ANSWER: 



The United States maintains strict policies with respect to the transfer of U.S. 
technology, and we have continuously impressed upon our allies this fact. Therefore, when 
we receive reliable reports of possible diversions, we discuss them with the appropriate 
country. We report to Congress whenever required under Section 3 of the Arms Export 
Control Act. We have emphasized in our discussions with allies the need to deal with 
diversion questions, because we do not want them to become an obstacle to the close 
collaboration on defense issues which ha always characterized our relationship. 



What do you see as the proliferation risks of the U.S. -Japan FSX program, 
and the U.S-Korea fighter program? 

ANSWER: 

The United States has engaged in military coproduction or codevelopment programs 
only with countries that already have access to high levels of technology and where 
cooperation does not threaten our national security interests, including proliferation 
concerns. Additionally, we have focussed our efforts on projects that promote 
interoperability and mutual security relationships with our allies. Japan and South Korea, 
for example, are our closest friends and allies in North East Asia. Both relationships go 
back more than four decades, and exemplify the importance of close security cooperation. 

We have also taken steps with Japan and Korea to ensure that co-production and co- 
development agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) stringently control the 
transfer of sensitive technology and prevent the diversion of the technology to any 
unauthorized purposes. Any new co-production and co-development programs will be 
subject to the same close scrutiny. We judge the proliferation risks, therefore, to be low. 



Could you provide the Committee with your assessment of all major U.S. 
military coproduction and codevelopment programs, from the standpoint of 
proliferation risks? 



ANSWER: 



The United States has engaged in military coproduction or codevelopment programs 
only with countries that already have access to high levels of technology and where 
cooperation does not threaten our national security interests, including proliferation 
concerns. We have not engaged in cooperation that would significantly enhance other 



84 



countries' offensive, military capabilities, thereby jeopardizing regional stability. Nor have 
we entered into cooperative agreements with countries that do not have effective export 
control regimes to prevent the flow of sensitive items and technologies outside their borders. 

Rather, we have focussed our efforts on projects that promote interoperability and 
mutual security relationships with our allies. Japan and South Korea, for example, are our 
closest friends and allies in North East Asia. Both relationships go back more than four 
decades, and exemplify the importance of close security cooperation. 

We have taken steps to ensure that co-production and co-development agreements 
and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) stringently control the transfer of sensitive 
technology and prevent the diversion of the technology to any unauthorized purposes. Any 
new co-production and c o-development programs will be subject to the same close scrutiny. 

Because we do not have cooperative agreements with known or suspected 
proliferators and include stringent controls in the agreements we do have, the fundamental 
issues are less proliferation and national security concerns, than economic and commercial 
issues i.e., the possibility that foreign industry could adapt or use U.S. military technology 
to make gains in U.S. and world markets, to the disadvantage of U.S. industry. An issue for 
consideration is the extent to which U.S.-origin technology could be adapted to commercial 
uses to increase a foreign country's competitive position in various fields, including airliners, 
business jets, and small space launch vehicles. 

Also, even countries which strictly control their defense exports to third countries as 
well as their own defense acquisitions could apply U.S. military technology to further 
develop their own indigenous arms industry for export to the United States. These countries 
could use U.S.-origin technology to become competitors to our domestic industry for the 
provision of components, subsystems, and systems to the U.S. military. Growing U.S. 
dependence on foreign sources, such as Japan and Korea, for critical military technology has 
been raised as a concern in public debates, and this deserves attention as we develop these 
relationships in the future. 

In the past, we have sought MOUs and end-use assurances guaranteeing that military 
technology would not be diverted to unapproved military projects or to the commercial 
sector and ensuring respect for intellectual property rights for any patents that might arise 
from the coproduction or joint research. We have sought to balance the potential 
disadvantages of codevelopment and coproduction programs with the potential advantage 
of flow-back of new technology which arises as part of the project. We are on our guard 
against weighing technology flow-back too heavily when evaluating the merits of a program, 
but recognize that coproduction and codevelopment projects can offer the opportunity for 
U.S. industry to gain access to new technology as well as lower the cost and improve the 
quality of military systems and equipment for our armed forces. 



85 



2. What is the Clinton Administration's policy regarding the transfer of U.S. defense 
articles and services that have been declared excess? 

ANSWER: 

During this period of fiscal constraint and decreasing security assistance levels, 
prudent transfers of EDA on a grant or low cost basis are a sensible, cost effective method 
to assist friends and allies meet their legitimate defense requirements. Because of DOD 
downsizing, substantial amounts of DoD equipment are likely to become excess to DoD 
force requirements and thus available for sale or transfer to eligible countries in the next 
few years. 



Does the Clinton Administration have any plans to submit new policy 
guidelines with respect to the transfer of U.S. defense articles and services 
that have been declared excess? 



ANSWER: 



A full review of our conventional arms transfer policy is now underway. We expect 
to complete that review and to issue new policy guidelines with respect to aU conventional 
arms transfers early in 1994. Those criteria will apply both to transfers of excess defense 
articles and to proposed transfers of new equipment. 

What amount of U.S. defense articles and services do you believe will be 
declared as excess over the next 2-3 years? 

ANSWER: 

Unfortunately, it is difficult for the military departments to project estimates for EDA 
over the next few years since articles can only be declared excess after they are found to be 
in excess of the Approved Force Acquisition Objective and Approved Force Retention 
Stock. As well, budget uncertainties, realignment of the force structure, and other ongoing 
reviews make projections of EDA availability even more problematical. Once force 
reductions and mission realignments have stabilized, more accurate projections may be 
possible. 



Should the Committee anticipate a determination that F-16 fighter aircraft 
will be declared excess in the near future? 

ANSWER: 

There are no plans to declare F-16's excess. Given the requirements for an excess 



86 



declaration, I do not anticipate such a move in the near future. There may, however, be 
some non-excess F-16 sales to foreign governments from Air Force inventory. 



rV. COUNTRY QUESTIONS 



A. Iran 



1. For a number of months now we have heard that the Administration is 
considering the application of the Boeing company for a license to sell 20 Boeing 737 
passenger aircraft to Iran. 

What is the status of this matter? 

ANSWER: 

Due to the confidentiality provisions of Section 12(c) of the EAA, I cannot confirm 
or deny the existence of any requests to sell aircraft to Iran. However, under the Iran-Iraq 
Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Title XVI of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1993), license applications for the export of commodities controlled for 
foreign policy or national security reasons, including dual use items, cannot be approved for 
Iran. The law provides for exceptions for contracts concluded before the effective date of 
the Act and for issuance by the President of a national-interest waiver. 

Has a decision been taken by the Administration? 

ANSWER: 

Due to the confidentiality provisions of Section 12(c) of the Export Administration 
Act, I cannot confirm or deny the existence of any requests to sell aircraft to Iran. 

If not, why has this decision been delayed for so long? 

ANSWER: 

Due to the confidentiality provisions of Section 12(c) of the Export Administration 
Act, I cannot confirm or deny the existence of any requests to sell aircraft to Iran. 

How would approval of the sale fit in with U.S. efforts to persuade its allies 



87 



not to sell dual use items to Iran? 

ANSWER: 

While I cannot confirm or deny the existence of any requests to sell aircraft to Iran 
because of the confidentiality provisions of section 12(c) of the Export Administration Act, 
the President has stated he intends to pursue a firm policy toward Iran. Current policy does 
not allow for aircraft sales to Iran. 

By the same measure, USG policy -- while stricter at this time than the policies of 
our allies in respect to dual use transfers to Iran -- does not represent a total embargo on 
all dual use sales to Iran, but does prohibit specific goods identified in law or regulation. 

We continue to purse vigorously with our allies a coordinated approach -- including 
for dual use exports -- to dealing with Iran's behavior, which on a number of issues is 
completely unacceptable. This includes Iran's support for and sponsorship of terrorism, its 
violent opposition to the Middle East peace process, its human rights abuses at home, its 
quest for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and its efforts to subvert 
moderate governments throughout the region. 



What dual use items have been sold by or are in the pipeline from our allies? 

ANSWER: 

We do not have a complete or detailed picture of what dual-use items have bene sold 
to Iran or are in the pipeline from our allies -- or from other producers. This is one of the 
reasons why we have considered it important to advance our initiative for multilateral 
coordination of dual-use items to states whose behavior is a cause for serious concern, such 
as Iran. Under our approach, there would be transparency and multilateral coordination 
among the major producers of dual-use technologies for such transfers on the basis of an 
agreed list of items. 

B. South Asia 



1. Does the administration plan to ask for any changes in the Pressler amendment 
[under which most U.S. aid to Pakistan is prohibited because of Pakistan's nuclear 
activities]? 

If not, does this indicate that you are resigned to the present impasse 
in US-Pakistani relations? 



88 



ANSWER: 

The discussion draft of the rewrite of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) omits all 
country specific amendments, including the Pressler Amendment. In an effort to preserve 
the President's flexibility in carrying out foreign policy, the FAA rewrite imposes generic 
foreign aid sanctions on the basis of objectionable activities by other goverrunents (e.g., gross 
human rights violations, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, etc.). 

This does not indicate any weakening of the Administration's desire to check nuclear 
proliferation in South Asia. Pakistan will continue to be subject to sanctions under the 
Administration's proposal. 

The FAA rewrite retains sanctions from the existing Foreign Assistance Act for 
objectionable behavior in the nuclear field, drawn directly from the passages known as the 
Glenn, Symington, and Solarz amendments. 

In addition, as a matter of Administration policy, satisfaction of the Pressler standard 
will remain the essential basis for exercising the national interest waiver in the rewrite and 
for resuming economic and military assistance, or for any decisions by the U.S. Government 
to sell or transfer military equipment or technology to Pakistan. 

Should such a waiver for Pakistan be considered in the future, obviously, we would 
consult with Congress. 

We are not resigned to a state of impasse in South Asia with regard to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

We believe there may be means to make significant progress in achieving our 
nonproliferation objectives in that region. We believe the President's global 
nonproliferation initiatives -- e.g., the CTBT and fissile material cutoff initiative -- may offer 
us ways to move forward on this issue. 

We will consult closely with Congress on our efforts to achieve the objective of 
reducing and finally eliminating the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
in South Asia. 

We will continue to work with Congress in completing the final submission of the 
rewrite of the Foreign Assistance Act. 



2. The U.S.-Indian agreement on the Tarapur nuclear plant has expired. 
Is India abiding by international safeguards at Tarapur? 



89 



ANSWER: 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to apply safeguards at 
Tarapur under an agreement entered into by the Government of India and the Agency to 
continue safeguards on an interim basis until December 31, 1993, pending negotiation of a 
new safeguards agreement for the post-December 31 period. The IAEA Board of 
Governors is scheduled to review for approval in early December a draft of a new 
safeguards agreement. 



What steps have been taken to prevent this issue from becoming a 
major diplomatic problem between India and the U.S.? 



ANSWER: 



The United States and India have been consulting closely on issues arising from the 
expiration of the Tarapur Agreement, including during two days of discussions in mid- 
September. We expect that these consultations will continue. 

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